On 29 Jul 2016, at 06:20, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If computationalism is correct then everything about "you"
can be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position
and velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for
the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the machine can't do that then
computationalism is wrong, but you can't
just assume computationalism can't do something (like
duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim you've proven something
about computationalism.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true,
you just assume it's not true ( by assuming " The duplicating
machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov ") and
then a few steps later claim to have proven something.
That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno
correctly, his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the
sum over all computations passing through your conscious state, or
something similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in
complete detail, then you have nothing more than yet another
computation that passes through your conscious state, so there can
be only one consciousness!
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics'
over such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is
still only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility
cannot be ruled out a priori -- that might in fact be the result
of such a duplication experiment. I think this is a question that
can only be resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating
machine and see what happens!
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation
twice necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness,
so, despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a
person does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view
from the 3p perspective),
It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another
person, it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also
physics that is below or indirectly related conscious experience.
This is what makes you a different person from who you were in the
past.
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from
the original, so how come they can be said to be the same person as
the original?
By step 1.
Personal identity through time seems to be related to psychological
continuity;
With a topology related to computability. OK.
the two (divergent) duplicates are both psychologically continuous
with the original, so both are the original person.
Indeed, in the personal identity sense, already used in step 1.
Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival' to
be a more significant consideration. Survival as in psychological
continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But then, is one
psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?
That is a question which might have some interest, but is not relevant
in our physical prediction, as we need only full developed physical
experimenters, and clear cut protocol like in step 3.
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno,
based on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is
some essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories
and hence of his past experience. If it's independent of
experience then it can't be bifurcated by experience.
That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems to
be important to personhood.
Except that computationalism refutes dualism, and indeed, eventually
the primary aristotelian matter has to go away. So we get an
immaterialist monism, with only number relations, and the
psychological content becomes modal variants of machine self-
reference, already imposed by computer science. Indeed, incompleteness
refutes Socrates critics of the most used definition of knowledge ([]p
& p), which associates an intuitionist, solipsist-like, subject to any
universal Löbian machine. That is what makes UDA easy to translate in
pure arithmetic, by invoking the non syntactical notion of
arithmetical truth. That works indeed.
Bruno
Bruce
Brent
it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness
survives in an uncertain world. (The one consciousness may inhabit
two physical bodies, but computationalism claims that it is the
computation that constitutes consciousness, not the physical
location, substrate, or number of copies of that computation.)
Bruce
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