On 29 Jul 2016, at 03:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can
be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and
velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-
view, EVERYTHING! If the machine can't do that then
computationalism is wrong, but you can't just assume
computationalism can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view
pov) and then claim you've proven something about computationalism.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true,
you just assume it's not true ( by assuming " The duplicating
machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov ") and
then a few steps later claim to have proven something.
That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly,
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all
computations passing through your conscious state, or something
similar.
A sum on computation is a 3p notion. You, in the 1-p sense, cannot be
an 1p notion. What can be said in the computationalist frame is that
your first person expectation depends on the differentiation of the
computations going through your actual state.
Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail, then you
have nothing more than yet another computation that passes through
your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!
Exact. A point on which I insisted right at the beginning, and on
which John Clark agrees.
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever
OK. But we are at step 3, which uses a simple ideal protocol, where
only two computations involved, the HW one and the HM one.
(physics is only the 'statistics' over such multiple computations).
That is what we are proving, and belongs to step 7 (and 8 pour the
immaterial/arithmetical computations)..
After the duplication, there is still only one consciousness, albeit
in a divided body.
Here we talk about first person experience, so consciousness is
distinguished by its content.
So the one consciousness does see both cities at once. This
possibility cannot be ruled out a priori -- that might in fact be
the result of such a duplication experiment.
Then there is only one person, even now (I am Bruce Kellet, in that
case). That can be true, but is irrelevant for the prediction and
physics recovering, unless you mean that such a consciousness do see
*in the first person sense* both cities, but in that case you
introduce spooky action at a distance, or some telepathic ability,
which, in our protocol is impossible (as we assume computationalism
and the correctness of the choice of the substitution level).
I think this is a question that can only be resolved empirically --
produce a person duplicating machine and see what happens!
We assume computationalism, so the issue is resolved by elementary
simple reasoning. It is the same as duplicating a program, and yu
would need to assume that computationalism is false to get one
consciousness aware of the two cities. But when the guy is
reconstituted in W (resp. M), he is the same program than he was in
Helsinki, and that program has only access to what he finds in W
(resp. M).
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation twice
necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, so,
despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a person
does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view from the
3p perspective),
I challenge you to find a post where I disagree with this. "Despite
Bruno claims" shows that you don't read the posts.
it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness survives
in an uncertain world.
It increases the chance that I will not find myself in W (resp M), or
in M (resp W). Yes, that is the FPI.
Bruno
(The one consciousness may inhabit two physical bodies, but
computationalism claims that it is the computation that constitutes
consciousness, not the physical location, substrate, or number of
copies of that computation.)
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
