On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 30/07/2016 6:37 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Jul 2016, at 03:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail, then you
have nothing more than yet another computation that passes through
your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!
Exact. A point on which I insisted right at the beginning, and on
which John Clark agrees.
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever
OK. But we are at step 3, which uses a simple ideal protocol, where
only two computations involved, the HW one and the HM one.
But you are making a physicalist assumption -- viz., one body/brain,
one consciousness, so duplicating the body/brain produces two
separate consciousnesses.
When we open the door.
Also, I assume doctors and brains, and computers, but I do not assume
them as primary. Indeed the conclusion will be that we must retrieve
them from the "arithmetical web of dreams", that is arithmetic, or
from any Turing-complete (first order logical) theory.
(physics is only the 'statistics' over such multiple computations).
That is what we are proving, and belongs to step 7 (and 8 pour the
immaterial/arithmetical computations)..
After the duplication, there is still only one consciousness,
albeit in a divided body.
Here we talk about first person experience, so consciousness is
distinguished by its content.
Is it necessary that one consciousness has only one content?
? No. But it is necessary that the content are logically compatible so
that you remain consistent.
So the one consciousness does see both cities at once. This
possibility cannot be ruled out a priori -- that might in fact be
the result of such a duplication experiment.
Then there is only one person, even now (I am Bruce Kellet, in that
case). That can be true, but is irrelevant for the prediction and
physics recovering, unless you mean that such a consciousness do
see *in the first person sense* both cities, but in that case you
introduce spooky action at a distance, or some telepathic ability,
which, in our protocol is impossible (as we assume computationalism
and the correctness of the choice of the substitution level).
I do not think that any "spooky action at a distance" is necessary.
To think that it is necessary for one consciousness to inhabit two
distinct bodies is to make a physicalist assumption
Exactly. That is what Clark tries to do.
-- namely, to identify consciousness with the activity and content
of a single brain. If we drop that assumption, consciousness, per
se, is not tied to a single location --
Very good (old) point. The UDA is all about that. Eventually "one
consciousness (with content)" is associated with the infinitely many
relative computational states in arithmetic, and their "next" states,
as seen from the 1p view, is given by the statistics on all those
computations going through those states. You are going in the valid
direction here.
it could be in several places (or times) at once without the need
for any physical connection (that is what non-locality is all about).
Exactly!
Consider ordinary consequences of introspection: I can be conscious
of several unrelated things at once. I can be driving my car,
conscious of the road and traffic conditions (and responding to them
appropriately), while at the same time carrying on an intelligent
conversation with my wife, thinking about what I will make for
dinner, and, in the back of my mind thinking about a philosophical
email exchange. These, and many other things, can be present to my
conscious mind at the same time. I can bring any one of these things
to the forefront of my mind at will, but processing of the separate
streams goes on all the time.
Given this, it is quite easy to imagine that a subset of these
simultaneous streams of consciousness might be associated with
myself in a different body -- in a different place at a different
time. I would be aware of things happening to the other body in real
time in my own consciousness -- because they would, in fact, be
happening to me.
If you dissociate consciousness from an actual single brain, then
these things are quite conceivable.
Dissociating consciousness from any actual single brain is what UDA
explains in detail. Then the math shows that this dissociation run
even deeper, as your 1p consciousness is associated with the
infinitely many relative and faithful (at the correct substitution
level or below) state in the (sigma_1) arithmetical relations.
Duplication experiments would then be a real test of the hypothesis
that consciousness could be separated from the physical brain. If
the duplicates are essentially separate conscious beings, unaware of
the thoughts and happenings of the other, then consciousness is tied
to a particular physical brain (or brain substitute).
Not at all, but it might look like that at that stage, but what you
say does not follow from computationalism. The same consciousness
present at both place before the door is open *only* differentiated
when they get the different bit of information W or M.
However, if consciousness is actually an abstract computation that
is tied to a physical brain only in a statistical sense, then we
should expect that the single consciousness could inhabit several
bodies simultaneously.
It is irrelevant to decide how many consciousness or first person
there is. We need only to listen to those which have differentiated to
extract the statistics.
I think this is a question that can only be resolved empirically
-- produce a person duplicating machine and see what happens!
We assume computationalism, so the issue is resolved by elementary
simple reasoning. It is the same as duplicating a program, and yu
would need to assume that computationalism is false to get one
consciousness aware of the two cities.
I do not assume computationalism. I am exploring the consequences of
computationalism
Well, that is what logician means by assuming something. We do that to
explore the consequence, may be to find a way to refute the assumption
and learn something.
to see if it might possible have something to offer to the science
of consciousness. In other words, I entertain the possibility that
computationalism might be false.
Same as me.
Actually, I show that if computationalism is true, then no sound
machine can ever be convinced rationally that it is true.
Computationalism justifies completely why its truth needs an act of
faith. Indeed a very strong one. Actually two strong one: Church
thesis + yes doctor. Note that Church thesis presuppose some amount of
arithmetical reality (but then all sciences do).
But when the guy is reconstituted in W (resp. M), he is the same
program than he was in Helsinki, and that program has only access
to what he finds in W (resp. M).
The program might access only the data available in a particular
situation, but consciousness might reside in the program itself,
regardless of the particular data being processed. That certainly
seems to be the case for me -- I am the same conscious being whether
I am processing emails, or driving my car, and so on. So the same
consciousness can readily process different data at the same time.
You preach the choir. But that is part of the explaination of why
computationalism entails the FPI, and eventually the necessity to
derive physics from elementary arithmetic.
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation
twice necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness,
so, despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a
person does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view
from the 3p perspective),
I challenge you to find a post where I disagree with this. "Despite
Bruno claims" shows that you don't read the posts.
You say that the M-guy is different from the W-guy because he has
different data.
I say that the M guy see M, and that the W-guy see W, and that is all
we need to have both guys confirming the Helsinki prediction "W v M
but not both", and refuting the Helsinki prediction "I see both W and
M, and everything remains symmetrical, without me having not got any
bit of information".
You deny that these, although they both descend from the H-guy, are
identical to either the H-guy or each other, so they are separate
consciousnesses -- else they could not have different 1-views.
You really seem to not read what I write, or just look at the papers.
On the contrary I say that both remains the H-guy, despite they have
become relatively different persons.
If they were not the same H-guy, there would be no relative first
person indeterminacy, obviously.
it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness
survives in an uncertain world.
It increases the chance that I will not find myself in W (resp M),
or in M (resp W). Yes, that is the FPI.
Finding yourself in both W&M is clearly a possible outcome of the
duplication experiment.
In the 3-1 description. yes. That is part of the protocol, so no one
ever discussed this.
But, as I have always made precise, the W and M occurence in the
question refer to the FIRST PERSON result of the experience of opening
the box, that the computationalist in Helsinki know that he will
experiment with probability 1 (assuming comp and the default hyp.),
without being able to predict what city will be seen.
There is nothing logically impossible in this -- unless you assume
physicalism and tie consciousness totally to a physical brain.
Exactly. You progress. But please read the post, as you repeat my
points like if I was saying the contrary. But most points you make
here are valid, and converge toward the proof that there is a first
person indeterminacy, and that indeed, a first person cannot be
associated to any singular instantiation of a computation, but to
*all* of them (going through the actual relative, and indexical, state).
Bruno
Bruce
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