On Tuesday, 2 August 2016, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> On 8/1/2016 12:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 August 2016 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote:
>
>
>> I do not think that any "spooky action at a distance" is necessary. To
>> think that it is necessary for one consciousness to inhabit two distinct
>> bodies is to make a physicalist assumption -- namely, to identify
>> consciousness with the activity and content of a single brain. If we drop
>> that assumption, consciousness, *per se*, is not tied to a single
>> location -- it could be in several places (or times) at once without the
>> need for any physical connection (that is what non-locality is all about).
>>
>
> A duplicate of my brain with the same inputs would, under the physicalist
> assumption, have the same experiences. That would mean that I could not say
> which brain my consciousness was linked to; if one brain were destroyed, my
> experience would continue uninterrupted. On the contrary, it would require
> a non-physicalist theory of some sort if the consciouness of two identical
> brains could be distinguished.
>
>
> But "identical" means having the same inputs.  So you're agreeing with
> Bruce that if duplicated brains getting different inputs (because they are
> in physically different locations) have the same experiences, i.e. they
> both experience perceptions related to the two locations, then they are
> instantiating only one consciousness.  If one were destroyed, the single
> consciousness might continue without the perceptions of the other (like
> closing one eye) or it might experience some other diminution.  That's the
> empirical question.
>

It's an empirical question, but there's no reason to believe the copies
will develop magical powers.


> Personally, I suspect something like Dennett's multiple drafts is right
> model.  Already in you brain there are modules dealing with different
> perceptions, as in Bruce's example of driving.  He is conscious of the
> traffic and road and the car, but at a different level than musing over
> philosophical problem at the same time, and he may also be listening to the
> radio via another module.  What we call "conscious thoughts" are just the
> winners among these modules who are competing to be the ones that enter the
> memory narrative; the answer to the question, "What did you think about
> while driving home, dear?"
>
> Brent
>



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-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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