On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions
If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?
This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that
consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain -
something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.
Yes, if consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, then of
course that is what we might expect -- two brains ==> two
consciousnesses. But that says nothing about the case of two
identical brains -- is there one or two consciousnesses? The default
assumption around here appears to be that the identity of
indiscernibles will mean that there is only one conscious being. The
question is then how this consciousness evolves as inputs change?
I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes on the
brain, so two different brains will realize two different
consciousnesses because they are at different locations and perceiving
different things.
That is fine if they started off different, and were never identical --
identical in all details, not just sharing single "observer moments",
even if such can be well-defined.
I would speculate that it would be just like having two autonomous
Mars rovers that "wake up" at different points on the surface. They
may have the same computers and sensors and programs, but their data
and memories will immediately start to diverge. They won't be
"completely" different, as identical twins aren't completely
different. They may even occasionally think the same thoughts. But
relativity tells us there's no sense to saying they think them at the
same time.
But Mars rovers are not conscious -- or are they?
I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument. He
just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that it's
irrelevant.
I disagree. I think it is crucial for Bruno's argument. He cannot
derive the differentiation of consciousness in this duplication case
from the YD+CT starting point, so where does it come from?
In his theory, it the physics and the consciousness must both derive
from the infinite threads of computation by the UD. I'm just making
the point that he does need to derive the physics, specifically the
finite speed of communication in order to show that the duplication
results in two different consciousnesses.
The finite speed of communication is a problem only if consciousness is
localized to the physical brain -- if it is a non-local computation,
this might not be an issue.
It seems to me an experimental matter -- until we have duplicated a
conscious being, we will not know whether the consciousnesses
differentiate on different incomes or not.
Suppose their is an RF link between them so they can share
computation, memory, sensor data,... Then we'd be inclined to say
that they could be a single consciousness. But now suppose they are
moved light-years apart. They could still share computation, memory,
etc. But intelligent action on the scale of an autonomous rover would
have to be based on the local resources of a single rover. So they
would have to effectively "differentiate". It wouldn't be some kind
of axiomatic, mathematically provable differentiation - rather a
practical, observable one.
Yes, that makes sense. But the rovers are not conscious. And if they
were placed at different points on the surface of Mars, they would have
to start with at least some different data -- viz., their location on
the surface relative to earth. The general issue I am raising is that
consciousness could be non-local, in which case separated duplicates
would not need any form of subluminal physical communication in order to
remain a single conscious being.
You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical matter. If
we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being, then separate the
duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it was still aware of its
duplicate. If the answer is "No", then we know that consciousness is
localized to a particular physical body. If the answer is "Yes", then we
know that consciousness is non-local, even though it might still
supervene on the physical bodies. The latter possibility seems the more
likely if consciousness is, at root, non-physical, so that the physical
is an epiphenomenon of consciousness.
Bruce
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