On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 9:05 am, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions.
This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that
consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain -
something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.
I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument. He
just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that it's
irrelevant.
Brent
Physicality in the thought experiment seems like a red herring to
me. We can just as easily consider running the duplicated
consciousnesses in virtual reality simulators of the two cities.
You would still have to build into your simulation whether or not
the consciousness differentiates -- begging the question yet again.
Of course, not for the same reason. Once the program are duplicated
virtually in different virtual environment, very elementary computer
science justifies why their memories and first person records diverge.
No need to invoke consciousness at this stage, which is a subtle
concept in need of explanation itself. But of course, computationalism
is the doctrine that we can *associate* some consciousness of the
first person experience to the first person account made by machine
and humans, duplicated or not.
Maybe you are just arguing against computationalism, but then we have
changed the topic without saying. I am agnostic, that is indeed why
motivates me for testing it, or test some version of it. The interest
in computationalism stems from its testable character.
you have not answered many questions I asked you, which were suppose
to show that the differentiation of consciousness is unvaoidable, once
we assume computationalism, and are OK that our children marry people
having a digital brain.
Bruno
Bruce
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