On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions
If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?
This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain - something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.
Yes, if consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, then of course that is what we might expect -- two brains ==> two consciousnesses. But that says nothing about the case of two identical brains -- is there one or two consciousnesses? The default assumption around here appears to be that the identity of indiscernibles will mean that there is only one conscious being. The question is then how this consciousness evolves as inputs change?
I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument. He just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that it's irrelevant.
I disagree. I think it is crucial for Bruno's argument. He cannot derive the differentiation of consciousness in this duplication case from the YD+CT starting point, so where does it come from? It seems to me an experimental matter -- until we have duplicated a conscious being, we will not know whether the consciousnesses differentiate on different incomes or not. It seems far from obvious to me, one way or the other. I can think of no general principles that would give a definitive answer here. Physics alone does not seem to be enough. Any attempted derivation from physics seems just to beg the question.
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