On 09 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/
assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different
perceptions
If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?
This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that
consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain -
something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.
Yes, if consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, then of
course that is what we might expect -- two brains ==> two
consciousnesses. But that says nothing about the case of two
identical brains -- is there one or two consciousnesses? The
default assumption around here appears to be that the identity
of indiscernibles will mean that there is only one conscious
being. The question is then how this consciousness evolves as
inputs change?
I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes
on the brain, so two different brains will realize two different
consciousnesses because they are at different locations and
perceiving different things.
That is fine if they started off different, and were never
identical -- identical in all details, not just sharing single
"observer moments", even if such can be well-defined.
I would speculate that it would be just like having two
autonomous Mars rovers that "wake up" at different points on the
surface. They may have the same computers and sensors and
programs, but their data and memories will immediately start to
diverge. They won't be "completely" different, as identical
twins aren't completely different. They may even occasionally
think the same thoughts. But relativity tells us there's no
sense to saying they think them at the same time.
But Mars rovers are not conscious -- or are they?
I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument.
He just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that
it's irrelevant.
I disagree. I think it is crucial for Bruno's argument. He
cannot derive the differentiation of consciousness in this
duplication case from the YD+CT starting point, so where does it
come from?
In his theory, it the physics and the consciousness must both
derive from the infinite threads of computation by the UD. I'm
just making the point that he does need to derive the physics,
specifically the finite speed of communication in order to show
that the duplication results in two different consciousnesses.
The finite speed of communication is a problem only if
consciousness is localized to the physical brain -- if it is a non-
local computation, this might not be an issue.
It seems to me an experimental matter -- until we have
duplicated a conscious being, we will not know whether the
consciousnesses differentiate on different incomes or not.
Suppose their is an RF link between them so they can share
computation, memory, sensor data,... Then we'd be inclined to
say that they could be a single consciousness. But now suppose
they are moved light-years apart. They could still share
computation, memory, etc. But intelligent action on the scale of
an autonomous rover would have to be based on the local resources
of a single rover. So they would have to effectively
"differentiate". It wouldn't be some kind of axiomatic,
mathematically provable differentiation - rather a practical,
observable one.
Yes, that makes sense. But the rovers are not conscious.
Why not? Suppose they are. If you would say "yes to the doctor"
then you must believe that AI is possible.
I have no reason to suppose that AI is not possible. But the Mars
rovers are unlikely to be sufficiently complex/self referential to
be conscious. Do they have an inner narrative?
And if they were placed at different points on the surface of
Mars, they would have to start with at least some different data
-- viz., their location on the surface relative to earth. The
general issue I am raising is that consciousness could be non-
local, in which case separated duplicates would not need any form
of subluminal physical communication in order to remain a single
conscious being.
You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical
matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being,
then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it
was still aware of its duplicate. If the answer is "No", then we
know that consciousness is localized to a particular physical
body. If the answer is "Yes", then we know that consciousness is
non-local, even though it might still supervene on the physical
bodies.
I don't think that's logically impossible, but it would imply FTL
signaling and hence be inconsistent with current physics. It can't
just be QM entanglement, because it share computation, to make a
difference at X due to a perception at Y requires signal
transmission.
Signal transmission or awareness? Non-locality does not entail FLT
signalling -- that makes it local.
The latter possibility seems the more likely if consciousness is,
at root, non-physical, so that the physical is an epiphenomenon of
consciousness.
Right, but then the challenge is to show that the physics
derivative from consciousness will exhibit spacetime finite
signaling speed as well as quantum entanglement.
Right, but first we have to derive real physics from consciousness.
If consciousness involves all of the infinity of computations that
pass through each observer moment, it seems that an awful lot of non-
locality is built into the whole enterprise.
Not built. Just unavoidable by the first person indeterminacy. An
event out of your light cone cannot influence yur body/brain in a 3p
way, but it can affect the first person statistics indeed.
Bruno
Bruce
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