If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove and demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent if only real is physically realised computations... Even the notion of realised computation proved by definition that computation is not a physical notion. Quentin
Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a écrit : > On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical > notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter, > computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a > physical notion. > > > That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, in > itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored physically). > Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it is an abstract > description of what a computer does. But the computer is physical, and the > computation does not exist absent the computer. > > It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis that > physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of > computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping of the > basest kind. > > Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, of > itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue that the > notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the physical otiose. > There is still no contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is > something that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction with > his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated > logical contradiction. > > Bruce > > > > Regards, > Quentin > > Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a > écrit : > >> On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> >>>>> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that >>>>> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul") >>>>> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this: >>>>> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is >>>>> that physicalism leads to a contradiction, >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction. Can spell out what that >>>> contradiction is? >>>> >>> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour): >>> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently >>> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe >>> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also >>> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a >>> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume >>> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation >>> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It >>> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or >>> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical. >>> >> >> This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact, >> you examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any >> computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer >> running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely >> physical concept. >> >> Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a >> computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to add >> something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that all >> computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require >> physical implementation. But that is merely the assumption that physicalism >> is false. So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not >> require a physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is >> perfectly possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that >> mathematical platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive >> physical universe and that any actual computations require a physical >> substrate -- as JC keeps insisting. >> >> No contradiction has been demonstrated. >> >> Bruce >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
