On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > > > On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> > >> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that > >> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul") > >> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this: > >> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is > >> that physicalism leads to a contradiction, > > > > > > I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction. Can spell out what that > > contradiction is? > > Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour): > If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently > supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe > your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also > in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a > far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume > that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation > argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It > follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or > temporally situated, thus cannot be physical. It is possible - addressing just this argument - that while mind is not localised it still needs to be implemented in a physical substrate. In this case we avoid dualism by reverting things: ok, so it is time > and space that are generated by mind. > > I think. > > Telmo. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
