The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
physical notion.

Regards,
Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>>> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
>>>> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
>>>> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
>>>> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
>>>> that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
>>> contradiction is?
>>>
>> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
>> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
>> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
>> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
>> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
>> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
>> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
>> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
>> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
>> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.
>>
>
> This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact, you
> examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any
> computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer
> running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely
> physical concept.
>
> Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
> computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to add
> something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that all
> computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
> physical implementation. But that is merely the assumption that physicalism
> is false. So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not
> require a physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is
> perfectly possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that
> mathematical platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive
> physical universe and that any actual computations require a physical
> substrate -- as JC keeps insisting.
>
> No contradiction has been demonstrated.
>
> Bruce
>
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