On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that >> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul") >> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this: >> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is >> that physicalism leads to a contradiction, > > > I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction. Can spell out what that > contradiction is?
Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour): If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or temporally situated, thus cannot be physical. In this case we avoid dualism by reverting things: ok, so it is time and space that are generated by mind. I think. Telmo. > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
