Le 26 avr. 2017 11:21 PM, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> a écrit :



On 4/26/2017 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> You can't invalidate an argument by invoking your own theory (which seems
> to assume that there is some world). Like Quentin said, when a world is
> assumed, it is only to get a reductio ad absurdum, in the computationalist
> theoretical frame.
>

I appreciate that.  But as I see it we have two theories: One supposes
there is a physical world and we observe it.  Within this theory there are
an enormous number of detailed, precise, surprising, accurate predictions.
The other makes only a few very general, qualitative predictions
(uncertainty, linearity,...).  It purportedly explains some things about
consciousness (e.g. limitations of self-knowledge) although this is
qualitative and is generally untestable.  But it supposedly makes the first
theory otiose.

Of course in science we don't need to choose between these theories - we
can wait and see what develops.  But claims that the second has proven the
first one wrong seem premature.

Brent


That 's not what is claimed... What is claimed is that *if* the second is
true, then the first is otiose.

Also, in *physicalist* frame saying mind supervenes on computations is
meaningless, in physicalist frame, mind supervene on matter, computation is
at most a description of what is.

Regards, Quentin


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