On 26 Apr 2017, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 25/04/2017 7:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Apr 2017, at 03:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/24/2017 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Apr 2017, at 13:38, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer
I am currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical
notation if you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any
process that takes input and produces output is a computation.
All physical objects do this. And physical objects do not know
any mathematics.
You assume that there are primary physical object.
Bruce's post refers to physical objects (one of which he perceives
immediately), but nothing he says depends on the physical objects
being "primary".
His last remark shows that he is interested in physics. But then
why does he participate in a discussion which is in metaphysics/
theology/cognitive-science?
I was interested to see if you had anything useful to offer. Also,
it seems to be a good idea to have a few contrary voices on this
list -- otherwise you would be speaking in an echo chamber where
everybody thought alike. Or else just preaching to the choir. That
is never a healthy situation.
We have to disagree if we want an interesting conversation.
But it is even more interesting when we talk on the points, and see if
and where we disagree, so that we can progress.
Pirmary matter is an hypothesis that we do in metaphysics/theology,
not in physics.
So if computationalism is just metaphysics/theology, what has it got
to do with the real world?
When you say "yes" to the doctor, you are practising that theology,
and are using some theotechnology, a limit of biotechnology. John
Clark, for example, told us that the did already say yes to a doctor
for some future through cryogenisation.
Then, the whole point is that the computationalist theology is
falsifiable in the real world. So let us see and explore.
You say that 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact in reality. But that is a fact only
in arithmetical reality.
"only" if you assume something else. Better to be neutral at the start.
It relates to the physical world only if one defines a mapping
between the symbols and experienced objects.
Experienced objects are appearance made by a brain, we don't know if
there is a physical *world*.
And the point is that if we assume digital mechanism, then below our
level of substitution, there is an infinity of universal numbers which
competes for your continuations. mechanism entails an 2^aleph_0-
plication experience. We can't use the traditional identity links.
So you have to map the computations of the dovetailer to the world,
Which world?
and that mapping is not part of the definition of the dovetailer.
Indeed. The dovetailer is executed in the model of arithmetic.
You seem to want to construct the necessary mapping by reference to
the perceived world, but that makes the perceived world logically
prior to your account of it -- you can't account for it unless you
already assume it.
I don't come up with any world. Strictly speaking, we have already an
explanation of the quantum appearance, but it is an open problem if
there is anything even looking like a complete physical worlds. It is
more like a web of dreams with a coherent core leading to deep
sharable computations, or relatively stable multi-user video games.
You can't invalidate an argument by invoking your own theory (which
seems to assume that there is some world). Like Quentin said, when a
world is assumed, it is only to get a reductio ad absurdum, in the
computationalist theoretical frame.
Bruno
Bruce
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