On 06 May 2017, at 23:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/6/2017 12:59 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 8:08 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/6/2017 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Exactly why I used arithmetic as the example. Arithmetic,
according to your theory of consciousness, is independent of
perception and physics. Conscious thoughts, beliefs are entailed
by arithmetic and so should be independent of tequila.
That does not follow. Even Robinso Arithmetic can prove that a
machine drinking some amount of tequila will prove anything.
That would be impressive. Is this proof published?
It is trivial. RA computes all states reaction in all computational
histories. RA is a universal dovetailer, to be short. In the
simulation of tequila + brain, people get drunk.
That's what I was afraid of. Your theory successfully predicts it
because it predicts "everything", including people drink tequila
and don't get drunk.
Yes, but the key is the measure, isn't it. Everett also predicts
that everything consistent with QM happens. Somehow this leads to a
probabilistic account of what to expect. We know the math but we
don't know the reason. You're no doubt bored with my banging on
about Hoyle, but I must say that his is so far the only metaphor
that has ever conveyed to me how something could be both certain
and uncertain depending on one's point of view. So I think it's far
too tricksy to say that comp predicts everything (or Everett, or
eternal inflation for that matter). The key is the measure and how
that measure discriminates between the typical, the unusual, and
the downright weird. Open problem, sure, but hardly an empty or
pointless one.
But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive
success.
No. Physicalism is refuted (in the Mechanist frame). It makes physics
not even able to predict that I will see a needle when looking at my
physical device.
And mechanism has strong predictive power, as shown by the meta-
reasoning, and its formalization in arithmetic. It asks for a lot of
work, but the contrary would have been astonishing, especially when we
see the irrational response to all this, which last since more than
1500 years in Occident.
QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol molecules in
the blood will interfere with neuronal function and THEN invoking
the physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind supervenes on
material events,
That could work, but not in a computationalist theory of mind. And,
then, we wait for that theory. the one given by Penrose might be an
embryo, but he got Gödel wrong, and a reasoning by Abner Shimony trows
doubt on the role consciousness could have in the wave packet reduction.
it predicts that your ability to do arithmetic will be impaired by
drinking tequila. It will NOT predict the contrary with more than
infinitesimal probability. So it's misdirection to say that it's
just a measure problem. Without having the right measure a
probabilistic theory is just fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say.
Not at all. The point is that if we believe in CT+YD we get that
measure problem. And its formalization in Arithmetic gives the
complete propositional solutions, which is promising for that measure
existence and isolation.
No magic here, unlike invoking the Primary Matter to select
computation in arithmetic, which is akin to "God made it".
Also, I insist, it is not "my theory". It is arguably one of the
oldest theory of humanity. It is the favorite theory of the strong
atheists and of the materialist, but they are shown to be
inconsistent, because the whole point is that Weak-Mechanism is
inconsistent with Weak-Materialism.
I am not coming with anything new. I just show that two widespread
beliefs are inconsistent with each other, then I use Gödel and the
quantum to show that the evidences add up for mechanism, against
materialism.
Bruno
Brent
David
Brent
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