On 5/7/2017 7:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 May 2017, at 23:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/6/2017 12:59 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 8:08 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/6/2017 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Exactly why I used arithmetic as the example.
Arithmetic, according to your theory of
consciousness, is independent of perception and
physics. Conscious thoughts, beliefs are
entailed by arithmetic and so should be
independent of tequila.
That does not follow. Even Robinso Arithmetic can
prove that a machine drinking some amount of tequila
will prove anything.
That would be impressive. Is this proof published?
It is trivial. RA computes all states reaction in all
computational histories. RA is a universal dovetailer, to be
short. In the simulation of tequila + brain, people get drunk.
That's what I was afraid of. Your theory successfully predicts
it because it predicts "everything", including people drink
tequila and don't get drunk.
Yes, but the key is the measure, isn't it. Everett also predicts
that everything consistent with QM happens. Somehow this leads to a
probabilistic account of what to expect. We know the math but we
don't know the reason. You're no doubt bored with my banging on
about Hoyle, but I must say that his is so far the only metaphor
that has ever conveyed to me how something could be both certain and
uncertain depending on one's point of view. So I think it's far too
tricksy to say that comp predicts everything (or Everett, or eternal
inflation for that matter). The key is the measure and how that
measure discriminates between the typical, the unusual, and the
downright weird. Open problem, sure, but hardly an empty or
pointless one.
But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive
success.
No. Physicalism is refuted (in the Mechanist frame). It makes physics
not even able to predict that I will see a needle when looking at my
physical device.
And mechanism has strong predictive power, as shown by the
meta-reasoning, and its formalization in arithmetic. It asks for a lot
of work, but the contrary would have been astonishing, especially when
we see the irrational response to all this, which last since more than
1500 years in Occident.
QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol molecules in
the blood will interfere with neuronal function and THEN invoking the
physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind supervenes on material
events,
That could work, but not in a computationalist theory of mind.
That is a computationalist theory of mind - i.e. thought supervenes on
the computations of the brain.
And, then, we wait for that theory.
No need to wait. It is already as complete a theory as saying mind
supervenes on the computational states of a UD.
Brent
the one given by Penrose might be an embryo, but he got Gödel wrong,
and a reasoning by Abner Shimony trows doubt on the role consciousness
could have in the wave packet reduction.
it predicts that your ability to do arithmetic will be impaired by
drinking tequila. It will NOT predict the contrary with more than
infinitesimal probability. So it's misdirection to say that it's
just a measure problem. Without having the right measure a
probabilistic theory is just fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say.
Not at all. The point is that if we believe in CT+YD we get that
measure problem. And its formalization in Arithmetic gives the
complete propositional solutions, which is promising for that measure
existence and isolation.
No magic here, unlike invoking the Primary Matter to select
computation in arithmetic, which is akin to "God made it".
It's magic when you say it's a trivial problem already solved in RA to
show that drinking tequila inhibits thinking about mathematics.
Also, I insist, it is not "my theory". It is arguably one of the
oldest theory of humanity.
Plato didn't think of digital computers, Church-Turing computation, a
UD, or quantum indeterminancy.
Brent
It is the favorite theory of the strong atheists and of the
materialist, but they are shown to be inconsistent, because the whole
point is that Weak-Mechanism is inconsistent with Weak-Materialism.
I am not coming with anything new. I just show that two widespread
beliefs are inconsistent with each other, then I use Gödel and the
quantum to show that the evidences add up for mechanism, against
materialism.
Bruno
Brent
David
Brent
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