On 31 Jul 2017, at 19:17, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jul 30, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
> wrote:
>> If the process were iterated N times times then all 2^N
copies will remember spending half their time in Moscow and half in
Washington, and none will see 2 cities at the same time; and
this is not gibberish because the 2^N copies are looking from the
present into the past and are just being asked what they remember,
they are NOT being asked to look from the present to the future in a
world with 1p duplicating machines and predict who will get some
mysterious thing nobody can define or point to called "THE the 1p",
> The copies will each have a memory of going into the machine
and ending up in one or other city each time.
Yes.
> They will also remember that each time they could not predict
which city they ended up in - it was like a coin toss. So if asked
what they will expect in future they will say that it will feel like
they will end up in one or other city, but they can't predict which.
You seem to believe the past and future are symmetrical and so can
be treated the same way, but they are not. We can remember the past
but not the future. Yes looking back it makes sense to say " back 5
copies ago I couldn't predict what city I will be in but now I know"
because now the meaning of the word "I" is clear in the context of
the person using the word. However back then it would make no sense
to say "I can't predict what city I will be in after 5 copies"
because then the word "I" was not uniquely defined, 32 (2^5)
individuals will have a equal claim to the title "I" and nobody can
say which one of the 32 people named Mr. I the prediction is
supposed to be about.
That is the first person indeterminacy.
But even with people duplicating machines you can always trace a
unique path from the present into the past and say which one of the
many copies was you and which ones were not, but that can never be
done into the future because the word "you" is undefined if you are
about to be duplicated.
It is not undefined. It is only ambiguous. But we made precise by
telling that the question is about the first person experience. It is
the 1p-you, or 1-you.
By your own reasoning above, it is only not predictible precisely. But
we can predict "W v M" will always be verified, and is the best
prediction possible. It makes the WM-self duplication equivalent, from
the 1-self perspective, to thrwing a coin.
This really shouldn't be a surprise, if it were not true then you
couldn't tell the difference between the past and the future. And
you can.
>> Please explain just how this bets works. When its all
over who decided who gets the rubles and dollars and how do they
make that judgement? Yes I know the ONE who gets THE the 1p
gets the money, but exactly what is THE the 1p and how is it
determined who has gotten it?
> Simpler than a bet, they put the dollars or roubles in their
pockets and the money gets duplicated along with the person.
This entire thing is suposed to be a step toward forging a link
between the objective and the subjective, but if it's not a bet, if
after the conclusion of it all the winners and losers can not be
objectively determined
If it could, the indeterminacy would be a 3p-indeterminacy, and that
would be absurd. But the question is about the 1p-self, not the 3p-self.
You want attribute to us a claim we never do. The indeterminacy is 1p,
subjective, but real if we do not eliminate the subjectivity, of
course. Computationalism is *defined* by a reference of keeping
consciousness (which is subjective per excellence) unchanged.
then it can't do that. it's not a experiment, it's not a thought
experiment, it's not even a bad thought experiment; it's just a
matter of personal preference that could be based on anything or on
nothing at all.
Not with the definition given. Please give an answer different from
the correct one (W v M), and I will show you why it will be refuted.
Bruno
It can teach us nothing about the nature of reality because there is
no disputing matters of taste.
John K Clark
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