On 16 Aug 2017, at 21:54, John Clark wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> What ONE thing will the ONE rat see in the future after the ONE
rat becomes 1024 rats? That can't be answered and it's not because
the answer is unknown , its because the answer does not exist and
never will.
> Of course the answer exist. It is "one of the 1024 experiences"
Then for gods sake tell us specifically which ONE of the 1024
experiences is the referent of the personal pronoun used in the
"question"!
If we were able to say in "Helsinki" which one the "1-you" refer, then
there would be no indeterminacy at all.
In the 3p view, the 1024 copies are that one, but none is able to
communicate which one it feels to be, and that is why there is no 3p
indeterminacy.
Yet, if you attribute to each of them consciousness, you know that
from their personal perspective, they got the answer, in a non
communicable way (but that is the case for all personal subjective
experience), and that is why they all live that first person
indeterminacy, and it makes sense for each them.
If you do that then and only then can we tell if the prediction
turned out to be correct or not.
If we were able to say in "Helsinki" which one the "1-you" refer, then
there would be no indeterminacy at all.
Your argument show that there is no third person indeterminacy.
But the point is that *all* copies make the (non communicable)
experience of the first person indeterminacy. The pronoun used in
Helsinki makes perfect sense (from the 1p view), and after pushing in
the button, they got the answer, as they known now which city they see.
Your critics would be valid if someone was claiming having derive a
third-person type of indeterminacy, but it is invalid for claiming
that there is no first person indeterminacy.
It is the same as the iteration of throwing a coin.
No it is not. With the coin if we say the probability is 50% it will
be heads we don't predict the coin will land in some ghostly
headstails state, we mean a prediction of heads will be correct
approximately half the time, and very importantly it also means that
after the coin is flipped we can determine if the heads prediction
was correct of not.
Yes OK. You are right again if we were claiming that the duplication
experience is as much a 3p indeterminacy than the thrown copying.
But the only thing I was claiming here, is that from the FIRST person
view of ALL copies, the experience is identical with the coin throwing.
But there is no way for ANYONE to EVER know if the prediction "I
will see Moscow" was correct or not.
There will be if ANYONE accompanies the candidate. I go in the cut-
box, in Helsinki, with you. You predict "Washington", say. You push on
the button. I open the door, from inside thus. And we both see
"Moscow". You were wrong.
There is only one thing we can be absolutely certain of is that
NOBODY will see 50% of Moscow.
Good. Nobody will see 50% of Moscow, and nobody will see, in the first
person sense, two cities. Everybody will see one city, and all copies
understand that this first person result was not predictable.
So you are reasoning like we would have claimed the existence of some
3p indeterminacy, but we claim only that there is an "1p indeterminacy".
I feel sorry for you, as you seem unable to take that 1p-person
experience into account, and refute only a claim of 3p-indeterminacy
that nobody has ever utter. I am sorry, but this is again your 1p/3p
confusion.
> What do you expect when you push the button?
Why do you care what anybody expects?
Because once you get that the experience is felt isomorphic to a coin
throwing, we can move to the next step, and if that is OK, we can get
the whole point of the reasoning which is that physics is reduced to a
statistics on first person indeterminacy defined in, and on, the
(sigma_1) arithmetical sentences.
The longer term goal is to show that if mechanism is correct, the
logic of the measure one is given by Bp & Dp, with p sigma_1. It is
nice, because the math shows it to be a quantum logic, with the
"formal quantization" appearing at the exact place it needs to be for
mechanism not (yet) being refuted.
What will happen is a tad more important than what somebody thinks
is going to happen.
This is like saying that what is a tad more important is the 3p view,
when the exercise asks you explicitly to consider the 1p views.
But no: we are asking to predict the 1-view accessible, not the 3p
view. You can't change the question in the middle of the reasoning.
You will have to judge if the exercise was important or not when you
get the final result.
People expect all sorts of things and very often their expectations
are wrong.
Yes, maybe. Like a guy who open the door in Moscow, but is so bad in
geography that he said "Oh that is Washington". Of course, we suppose
this to not happen in the default hypothesis.
And what the hell does the accuracy or inaccuracy of predictions
have to do with the continuous feeling of self anyway?
You tell me. I don't see the relevance of that remark. Again, you seem
to allude to things never said. The only point of this step is the
understanding that nobody can predict where he will think or feel to
be in such duplication. Then the next steps will help you to see why
we are interested in that first person indeterminacy.
In this post, you were clearer than usual, and can almost feel like
you really want to throw that 1p-experience notion away, as it is
clear that your argument would be valid if we were defending a new
form of 3p-indeterminacy, but that is not the case: we claim only that
there is an indeterminacy FROM THE 1P-VIEW(S) OF (ALL) THE
CANDIDATE(S). Singular before pushing on the button, and plural after.
I hope you get it now. You need only to do the step-3 thought
experience completely, and this ask you to put youself in the shoes of
an average copy. In the 27-iteration, the average copy will have some
"011101100010100100001110110" and will feel unable to say what he
could experience next, and this for obvious "mechanist" reason.
Bruno
John K Clark
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