On 23 Aug 2017, at 18:03, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>> To get the first person views, you need to tell me
which copy you ask the question,
>> Good god, do I really have to spell this out?!
I didn't ask either copy.
> That is your mistake. the prediction is done in Helsinki, but
the verification is done in the two W and M cities.
The question was asked by the Helsinki Man,
Well, actually, we ask the question to the Helsinki man, or he asks
the question to himself. (that helps to avoid possible confusion
later, but is not important).
the copies could not ask anything because they didn't exist yesterday.
No. It is always the "third person" who will ask all question, to the
Helsinki man, and to the copies.
And the Helsinki man already knew the Washington man will see
Washington
You already said this, but that is tautological, and the point is that
in Helsinki he does not know if he will feel to be the Washington man
or the Moscow man, given that he cannot feel being both at once.
and the Moscow man will see Moscow, he didn't need you to tell him
that and it would just be a waste of time to verify that after the
duplication.
That would be a wasting time indeed. But that is not the point, and
you continue to hide the 3p/1p distinction. Please use the diaries
which makes all this easy and 3p communicable. There is no difficulty
here, unless you make things looking gibberish by using pronouns
without adding the 1p.3p precision.
Yesterday the Helsinki man asked you:
"What is the name of the one and only one city I will see tomorrow
after I become two?"
Yesterday you couldn't answer the Helsinki man's question and even
today after learning all there is to know about how things turned
out you STILL can't think of anything meaningful you could have
answered the Helsinki man's question with.
On the contrary. Yesterday I tell him, you will see Washington, or
Moscow, but not both. It will be like a coin throwing. Today, both
copies agrees that indeed "W v M" was a good, and even the best
prediction available. Everyone is happy, and move to step 4.
And that tells the world one thing, it wasn't a question at all.
> what is written in each diary [...]
To hell with that idiotic diary!!!
Well, this betray that your goal is to NOT understand. In that case, I
can understand you want throw the diaries in Hell. This is a case of
destroying evidences to assess some ideology. We are not suppose to do
thing like that when serious.
> You have convinced nobody. You are alone on this one.
You keep saying that over and over as if this is a popularity
contest. Scientific laws are not determined by votes and neither is
logic.
Because you continue to talk with the tone "it is so obvious that you
are wrong", when is weird in a forum where everybody told you exactly
the mistake you did, and continue to do.
>What the H-guy cannot predict is if he...
Yep, personal pronouns do an amazingly good job at hiding fuzzy
thinking. Why else would Bruno Marchal keep using them?
There is no problem with this pronouns at all, given that we ASSUME
mechanism, and made clear that the question is about the future 1p
experience, which is obviously an experience of seeing only once city.
> ...will be the one feeling to have become the Moscow man, or
to the Washington man.
There is one and only one difference between M and W: M will see M
and not W and W will see W and not M.
So bot confirms "W v M", and both refute "W & M". And both understand
immediately that the Helsinki man would have been correct by
predicting "W v M" and false by predicting "W & M". Of course W and M
refers, like it has been said many times, to the experience lived by
the person opening the door after the duplication, and does not
concern the localizzation of the copies seen in a third person
perspective. Then what you just say here proves the 1p-indeterminacy.
That's it, What more is there to predict? What more is there to
say?
Well, after reminding the hypothesis and definitions, what is more is
the conclusion: the Helsinki man can only predict "W v M" and so is in
a state of maximal ignorance for his future. Like you just said, the H-
man who survived in the M-man see M and not W, and vice versa,
breaking the symmetry for each of the copy, who can witness obtaining
a bit of information, and understanding in this way that duplcation
leads to a string form of personal indeterminacy on the available
accessible experience.
Nothing more need to say indeed, and if you are OK, we can move t step
4.
> You mock the diaries,
I do indeed.
> but they are useful to see that in Helsinki, you cannot
predict what will be written in the diary that will be split.
I don't know what that means.
You are in Helsinki. You are asked to write what you expect to live in
the diary that you will take with you in the duplication machine. What
do you write?
1) W & M
2) W v M
3) W
4) M
5) something else (and then what).
By definition, I will say that the prediction P1 is better than a
prediction P2 if P1 is satisfied/verified by more copies than P2.
Which one you choose.
Keep in mind that "W" means "I see open the door, check which city I
am in, see it is Washington, and write W in the diary". And, for
example, if I predicted "M", or "M & W", that is refuted.
> The diary lakes this quasi-tautological, but not tautological.
I REALLY don't know what that means.
It means that "the M-man will see M" and "the W-man will see W" are
both tautological, but, in Helsinki, the proposition "me, the H-man,
who believe in comp and thus who believe he will survive in that
process will see M" , and "me, the H-man, who believes in comp and
thus who believes he will survive in that process will see W" are not.
The reason is that in Helsinki, you cannot be sure that you will
become the M-man, or the W-man. You can only be sure that you will
feel to be *one* of them.
> Just tell me what you write in the diary when still in
Helsinki.
"I like to write strings of words with a question mark at the
end."
This eludes the question.
Look, you have already accept to give your brain to a cryogenic
socitey. Imagine that in ten years, the mainstream in that domain give
good argument that, by not having encrypted your brain data, you will
be "reconstituted" infinitely often, and with a proportion of 98%
hellish environment, and 2 % of heavenly environment. What is the
probability that you would end up, from a first person perspective in
a hellish environment?
Bruno
John K Clark
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