On Friday, November 17, 2017 at 2:17:37 PM UTC-7, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Friday, November 17, 2017 at 11:30:04 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Thu, Nov 16, 2017 at 1:57 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > >>> I didn't mean to imply that all atoms in a baseball have the same >>> entangled state. >>> >> >> Then a baseball is not in one >> definite state >> . >> >> >> > >>> I just meant that whatever state it's in, it's not in contradiction with >>> REALISM. >>> >>> Even superpositions are not in contradiction with REALISM >>> >> >> We >> >> know >> >> the Bell Inequality is violated and that proves that if things are >> deterministic then either locality or REALISM or both are untrue. And we >> know the >> >> Leggett–Garg inequality >> >> is also violated and that proves that if things are deterministic and >> REALISTIC >> >> then >> >> the non-local forces must be very odd indeed, they >> >> must violate >> >> the Arrow If Time, that is to say the future must effect the past. >> Face facts, n >> o matter what turns out to be true of one thing we can be certain, it >> will be WEIRD! >> > > *How do you distinguish LOCALITY from REALISM?* > > *As I wrote, and you ignored, the constituents of the baseball are in > entangled states, with their neighbors to create the macro "object", and > some entangled in vibrational modes with the external environment. These > states are different and constantly fluctuating, but the overall "state" of > the object -- if one could be defined -- does NOT contradict localism or > realism -- which is what I thought we were discussing. OK, maybe not one > single state, but that's not what this discussion was about, from my pov.* >
*IIUC, and forgot to write, that these entangled states do NOT violate LOCALISM or REALISM because for each entangled state, a basis exists for which the entangled wf is an eigenfunction. CMIIAW*, > >> >> >>>> Explain to me how >>>> Everett's MWI >>>> can work without the Multiverse. The fact that string theory also >>>> needs a Multiverse just give more support to Everett, or at least it would >>>> if there were any experimental evidence to indecate string theory was >>>> true, >>>> >>>> >>> >>> > >>> The Many Worlds of Everett and String Theory have no direct or indirect >>> relationship >>> >> >> Except that they both require a multiverse, as does Big Bang Inflation >> theory. >> >> >> >>> > >>> You keep ignoring the fact that these other worlds, if they exist, arise >>> in totally different contexts and theories >>> >> >> >> Ignore it? I didn't ignore it I'm the one who pointed it out! Three >> entirely different theories in 3 apparently different areas of physics all >> were forced to come to the exact same conclusion, the Multiverse must exist. >> > > *I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. Rather, > it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some world. I see > no reason for this assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the > wf in order to avoid "collapse". Same situation in String Theory; no > "must"; simply other possible universes in the landscape. Do you really > think that when you pull a slot machine and get some outcome, the 10 > million other possible outcomes occur in 10 million other universe? Seems > ridiculous to me.* > >> >> >>> > >>> As for the continuity of time and space, to the extent we can test for >>> it, continuity is so far affirmed. >>> >> >> That is true, so far, of course we can never prove experimentally that its >> >> continuous, the best we can do is say if its granular >> >> then >> >> the grains must be smaller than X. >> >> I do admit that if space and time really are granular then much of my >> argument probably goes out the window. I say probably because if anything >> is going on >> >> at >> >> distances smaller than the Planck Length or during time less than the >> Planck Time we don't have a clue what they could be >> >> because >> >> both Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity break down entirely at such >> small scales and give nonsense answers. >> >> *> Essentially, all calculations and predictions in physics are >>> approximations. * >> >> >> Yes, a computer simulation of a hurricane is an approximation of the >> real thing. Suppose a meteorologist said "Its not my computer model's fault >> for not being exactly the same as the physical hurricane, its the physical >> hurricane's fault for not being exactly the same as my computer model". If >> mathematics is really more fundamental than physics then the meteorologist >> would have a point. >> >> >> > >> *> the fact that a Turing Machine can't do an exact calculation in >>> finite time seems irrelevant. * >> >> >> >> Forget finite, it can't do it even in infinite time! >> >> A supremely important type of physical machine can produce almost none of >> the Real Numbers even >> i >> n a >> n >> >> infinite >> amount >> of >> >> time, and that strongly suggests almost none of the Real Numbers are >> needed for a supremely important physical operation. That doesn't sound >> irrelevant to me. >> > > *Can't a Turing Machine calculate some rational numbers in finite time, > like .5, or calculate an irrational to arbitrary precision if allowed to > run long enough? I don't see what you are arguing. Physics uses > approximations regularly, always. Does this mean mathematical knowledge is > meaningless; just a "story"?* > >> >> * > if you claim irrational numbers are not fundamentally important for >>> physics, how do you account for the fact that PI comes up in Maxwell's >>> equations and Einstein's field equations? * >> >> >> In the entire history of the world nobody has ever made one single >> physical calculation using PI, they've only used approximations of PI. >> > > *The fact that PI can't be calculated precisely doesn't mean that > irrational numbers, in this case PI, are irrelevant to physics. Keep in > mind that if space-time is continuous, the Many Worlds allegedly manifested > as outcomes in a simple slit experiment is UNCOUNTABLE. * > >> >> John K Clark >> >> >> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
