On 2 December 2017 at 00:58, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> On 12/1/2017 4:46 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 2 December 2017 at 00:06, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/1/2017 3:48 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>> Another aspect of this is that if, in imagination, you progressively
>> reduce the duration of your effective short term memory, at some point you
>> will intuit that you have become effectively 'unconscious', or at least
>> un-self-conscious, as you will be unable to imagine formulating an
>> articulate thought or possibly even assembling a coherent series of sense
>> impressions or intuitions.
>>
>> Including the coherent thought that you have become effectively
>> 'unconscious'.
>>
>
> ​Yes indeed. Of course you realised that I meant "at some point you will
> intuit" only with reference to the relevant point in the thought
> experiment​, not to the imagined situation itself. In the latter case my
> contention was that "at some (i.e. the corresponding) point" you would in
> effect have become incapable of coherently intuiting even the thought of
> your 'lost consciousness', as you suggest.
>
>
> Jeff Hawkins discusses this in his book "On Intelligence".  He calls his
> model of intelligence memory+prediction and it is based more on brain
> neurophysiology and research than on computation (although he's a computer
> guy, inventor the Palm Pilot).
>

​Yes, that's interesting. From the evolutionary standpoint, leaving aside
distinctions of phenomenal versus 'access' consciousness, one might
speculate that the primary utility of conscious deliberation is that of
more accurate prediction of the future and consequently improved individual
and species survivability. I've been reading a book of Jonathan Haidt's
called "The Righteous Mind". One of the speculations based on his research
into what he calls moral intuitions is the importance to human evolutionary
success of 'shared intentionality'. This is the ability to intuit, share
and enact common purposes with others.

It is striking that other primates apparently have the ability to copy or
even originate certain behaviours of benefit to themselves individually but
not to intuit and hence share in others' intentions to the point of
benefitting significantly from novel forms of group cooperation. Plausibly
this is indeed related, amongst other neurocognitive deficits, to a less
than human capacity to retain complex memories and hence make sophisticated
extrapolations from a rich repertoire of experience.

David


>
> Brent
>
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