On 12/4/2017 4:59 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 December 2017 at 01:57, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/1/2017 5:21 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 December 2017 at 00:58, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/1/2017 4:46 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 December 2017 at 00:06, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/1/2017 3:48 PM, David Nyman wrote:
Another aspect of this is that if, in imagination, you
progressively reduce the duration of your effective
short term memory, at some point you will intuit that
you have become effectively 'unconscious', or at least
un-self-conscious, as you will be unable to imagine
formulating an articulate thought or possibly even
assembling a coherent series of sense impressions or
intuitions.
Including the coherent thought that you have become
effectively 'unconscious'.
Yes indeed. Of course you realised that I meant "at some
point you will intuit" only with reference to the relevant
point in the thought experiment, not to the imagined
situation itself. In the latter case my contention was that
"at some (i.e. the corresponding) point" you would in effect
have become incapable of coherently intuiting even the
thought of your 'lost consciousness', as you suggest.
Jeff Hawkins discusses this in his book "On Intelligence".
He calls his model of intelligence memory+prediction and it
is based more on brain neurophysiology and research than on
computation (although he's a computer guy, inventor the Palm
Pilot).
Yes, that's interesting. From the evolutionary standpoint,
leaving aside distinctions of phenomenal versus 'access'
consciousness, one might speculate that the primary utility of
conscious deliberation is that of more accurate prediction of the
future and consequently improved individual and species
survivability.
In Hawkins model the lower layers of the neocortex are continually
predicting what they will receive from the perceptive organs. If
a layer's prediction fails, the input is passed up to the next
layer and each layer has more extensive lateral connections than
the layer below it. So consciousness is emergent engagement of
the top layer; although Hawkins doesn't speculate much about this
as he is more interested in intelligence than consciousness.
This seems consistent with Jaynes's model, I think. It does seem
plausible that the predictive calculus would work its way up through
the levels as and when necessary in something like the way Hawkins
suggests and only 'emerge' fully at the neocortical level when 'all
else has failed', as it were. Then, in Jaynes's bicameral model, the
demand for a 'plan of action' would hopefully be satisfied with
respect to something like a pre-existing template that would be
communicated (principally in language) for reception and action by the
'non-self-conscious' actor.
This is very powerfully illustrated in the early scenes in the Iliad
when Achilles is only prevented from slaughtering Agamemnon by the
last minute intervention of Athena, who has to grab him by the hair to
restrain him (in this case we apparently have full visual, auditory
and tactile hallucination). Here we have the classically
un-self-conscious actor in the full tide of his right-brained bravura,
but with the fortunate intervention at the critical moment of his
'common-sense' hemisphere just in time to forestall mayhem. With the
later breakdown of bicamerality in certain individuals (presumably as
a consequence of relatively more efficient inter-hemispherical
neurological integration) the 'speaking' and 'listening' faculties
located in the separate hemispheres would have begun to coalesce, in
tandem with greater integration of planning and execution functions.
Odysseus, especially as portrayed in the Odyssey, might be the Homeric
exemplar of the newly 'integrated man', coping creatively and
constructively with one unexpected and novel catastrophe after another.
Yes, as Jaynes speculates the bicameral mind breaks down when there is
trade between different tribes and it becomes advantageous to be able to
lie, like the Wily Odysseus.
Funnily enough, I've often entertained the question, in moments of
reflection, of who is 'speaking' and who 'listening' with respect to
my inner dialogue. It may not be completely fanciful to link the
origin of these two aspects to separate though substantially
integrated hemispheres. After all, in sum they're both 'me'. I wonder
if there might be an experimental protocol that could settle the question?
Careful or you will find yourself agreeing with Dennett and his modular
mind, which borders on heresy in this list.
Brent
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