On Monday, December 4, 2017 at 6:19:01 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 03 Dec 2017, at 18:21, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 3, 2017 at 2:07:17 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 01 Dec 2017, at 00:20, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 11:16:07 PM UTC, [email protected] > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 9:47:37 PM UTC, Bruce wrote: > > On 30/11/2017 10:59 pm, [email protected] wrote: > > On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 11:42:51 AM UTC, Bruce wrote: > > On 30/11/2017 10:32 pm, [email protected] wrote: > > On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 4:08:20 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: > > On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, [email protected] wrote: > > On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote: > > On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > > I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, > > > > > Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation > applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is > unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the > value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for > example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI. > > > > Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if > > Newton's constant had any value other than > > 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2 > > the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1. > If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant > directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm > right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize. > > Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, that > is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary > transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary operator U can > be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the > adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation. > > *Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that describes > the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a > problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it effect > the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG * > > > Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- > intrinsically non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there > are plenty of non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with hidden > variables. > > *Why would it be non linear? Brent claimed (on page 1)* > > > Page 1 of what? > > > > *On Google it's organized as pages, now up to page 15. Go to top of thread > and read second message by Brent. AG * > > > * that if the QM could be made deterministic, say by a DE that described > collapse, it would imply awful consequences, such as the future determining > the past.* > > > No, it wouldn't imply that. > > * Would making QM into a deterministic theory imply an inconsistency in > the postulates of QM? TIA, AG* > > > QM in MWI is deterministic. Bohm's theory is deterministic, though > expressly non-local. Determinism is not really an issue. One world theories > are intrinsically random, not deterministic. > > > *How can MWI be deterministic if it can't tell us what outcome we will > observe in this world, or any other? AG* > > > Because MWI says that all outcomes are realized, each in a separate world. > Apparent randomness comes about because we don't know which world we will > end up in (though we actually end up in all the worlds, so we, or our > duplicates, observe all possible outcomes). > > Bruce > > > > > > > > *OK. I wouldn't use "deterministic" to describe that situation, but that's > neither here nor there. More important is Brent's reply to my question > which started this discussion thread. He stated that a deterministic ONE > WORLD version of QM would have dire effects, such as the future influencing > the past. His exact words are in the 2nd message in this discussion. You > don't seem to share this view. I know that Bohm developed a deterministic > version of QM which is expressly non-local and not covariant. I don't think > it's what Brent was referring to. Also, I noticed that Bruno, our resident > enthusiast of arithmetic as the solution to all enigmas,* > > > That is very elegant mathematically, but I am not necessarily enthusiast > about this, and sometimes I call Mechanism terrifying thinking. At the > first sight it entails that agonies are infinite, as your consciousness > survives in the closest environment/computations logically possible, and > there are an infinity of them. Nothing funny there. > > The point is that it is a logical consequence of what is perhaps the > oldest hypothesis in science: that life is a mechanism. Of course, the > infinite agony might end ... because things are more subtle when doing the > math, so no need to despair prematurely of mechanism either. Computer > science suggests some "jumps", which makes the prediction there very > difficult, but all in all, sometimes I wish death is an end. That is made > impossible with mechanism, as Descartes and many others intuited correctly. > > > *By "mechanism", I see you mean "materialism", the theory that life and > consciousness can be explained by the motion and interaction of atoms and > molecules. I see no evidence that death is not implied by materialism. I've > experienced the passing away of many, and its permanence is very > convincing. Moreover, cut a nerve and sensation ceases; be injected with an > anesthetic and one loses consciousness in a matter of seconds. All pretty > convincing that materialism is on the right track, as opposed to > speculation and fantasies about mathematics and arithmetic. AG* > > > > ? > > By mechanism I mean the idea that we can survive with an artificial > *digital* brain. Precisely: that it exists a level of granularity so that I > survive, or my first person experience remains unchanged, through a digital > (physical) simulation of my brain at that level. >
*I accept that within materialist theory as I have stated it, one could construct a perfect replica of a human brain with the consciousness implied by such a construction. However, that would be a clone of someone, not that someone. So I doubt your survival claim. AG* > > This is believed indeed by many materialists, but they use mechanism to > hide the mind-body problem. When, actually, Mechanism can be shown > incompatible with very weak form of materialism or physicalism. > *FWIW, I am not necessarily a huge enthusiast of materialism as I have defined it, but it certainly is persuasive given some of the evidence I have presented. Nor am I hiding the mind-body problem. I just have no clue as to the resolution. AG* > > To understand this, you need to understand a bit of computability theory > (alias Recursion Theory). Computation, simulation, emulation, are concepts > that can be defined in the arithmetical language, and the existence of > computati > ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
