On Wednesday, December 6, 2017 at 3:58:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Dec 2017, at 11:42, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Monday, December 4, 2017 at 6:19:01 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 03 Dec 2017, at 18:21, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, December 3, 2017 at 2:07:17 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 01 Dec 2017, at 00:20, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 11:16:07 PM UTC, [email protected] >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 9:47:37 PM UTC, Bruce wrote: >> >> On 30/11/2017 10:59 pm, [email protected] wrote: >> >> On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 11:42:51 AM UTC, Bruce wrote: >> >> On 30/11/2017 10:32 pm, [email protected] wrote: >> >> On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 4:08:20 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: >> >> On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, [email protected] wrote: >> >> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote: >> >> On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> >> > >> I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, >> >> >> > >> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation >> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is >> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the >> value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for >> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI. >> >> >> >> Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if >> >> Newton's constant had any value other than >> >> 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2 >> >> the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1. >> If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant >> directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm >> right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize. >> >> Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, that >> is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary >> transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary operator U can >> be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the >> adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation. >> >> *Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that describes >> the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a >> problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it effect >> the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG * >> >> >> Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- >> intrinsically non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there >> are plenty of non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with hidden >> variables. >> >> *Why would it be non linear? Brent claimed (on page 1)* >> >> >> Page 1 of what? >> >> >> >> *On Google it's organized as pages, now up to page 15. Go to top of >> thread and read second message by Brent. AG * >> >> >> * that if the QM could be made deterministic, say by a DE that described >> collapse, it would imply awful consequences, such as the future determining >> the past.* >> >> >> No, it wouldn't imply that. >> >> * Would making QM into a deterministic theory imply an inconsistency in >> the postulates of QM? TIA, AG* >> >> >> QM in MWI is deterministic. Bohm's theory is deterministic, though >> expressly non-local. Determinism is not really an issue. One world theories >> are intrinsically random, not deterministic. >> >> >> *How can MWI be deterministic if it can't tell us what outcome we will >> observe in this world, or any other? AG* >> >> >> Because MWI says that all outcomes are realized, each in a separate >> world. Apparent randomness comes about because we don't know which world we >> will end up in (though we actually end up in all the worlds, so we, or our >> duplicates, observe all possible outcomes). >> >> Bruce >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *OK. I wouldn't use "deterministic" to describe that situation, but >> that's neither here nor there. More important is Brent's reply to my >> question which started this discussion thread. He stated that a >> deterministic ONE WORLD version of QM would have dire effects, such as the >> future influencing the past. His exact words are in the 2nd message in this >> discussion. You don't seem to share this view. I know that Bohm developed a >> deterministic version of QM which is expressly non-local and not covariant. >> I don't think it's what Brent was referring to. Also, I noticed that Bruno, >> our resident enthusiast of arithmetic as the solution to all enigmas,* >> >> >> That is very elegant mathematically, but I am not necessarily enthusiast >> about this, and sometimes I call Mechanism terrifying thinking. At the >> first sight it entails that agonies are infinite, as your consciousness >> survives in the closest environment/computations logically possible, and >> there are an infinity of them. Nothing funny there. >> >> The point is that it is a logical consequence of what is perhaps the >> oldest hypothesis in science: that life is a mechanism. Of course, the >> infinite agony might end ... because things are more subtle when doing the >> math, so no need to despair prematurely of mechanism either. Computer >> science suggests some "jumps", which makes the prediction there very >> difficult, but all in all, sometimes I wish death is an end. That is made >> impossible with mechanism, as Descartes and many others intuited correctly. >> >> >> *By "mechanism", I see you mean "materialism", the theory that life and >> consciousness can be explained by the motion and interaction of atoms and >> molecules. I see no evidence that death is not implied by materialism. I've >> experienced the passing away of many, and its permanence is very >> convincing. Moreover, cut a nerve and sensation ceases; be injected with an >> anesthetic and one loses consciousness in a matter of seconds. All pretty >> convincing that materialism is on the right track, as opposed to >> speculation and fantasies about mathematics and arithmetic. AG* >> >> >> >> ? >> >> By mechanism I mean the idea that we can survive with an artificial >> *digital* brain. Precisely: that it exists a level of granularity so that I >> survive, or my first person experience remains unchanged, through a digital >> (physical) simulation of my brain at that level. >> > > *I accept that within materialist theory as I have stated it, one could > construct a perfect replica of a human brain with the consciousness implied > by such a construction. However, that would be a clone of someone, not that > someone. So I doubt your survival claim. AG* > > > Do you agree that the cone of you will doubt this? Especially after what > you just say here? >
*Many Worlds, even with identical replicas of observers, doesn't imply any form of immortality. It's like any clone or twins; notwithstanding identical DNA, the copies are separate and distinct individuals. AG* > >> This is believed indeed by many materialists, but they use mechanism to >> hide the mind-body problem. When, actually, Mechanism can be shown >> incompatible with very weak form of materialism or physicalism. >> > > *FWIW, I am not necessarily a huge enthusiast of materialism as I have > defined it, but it certainly is persuasive given some of the evidence I > have presented. * > > > The evidence you gave were evidence for mechanism, not for materialism. I > don't think there has been any evidence for materialism. But many people > confuse evidence for matter or for physics with evidence for materialism, > which is an hypothesis in metaphysics. yet, my papers shows how test > materialism versus mechanism (up to a logical possibility of being defeated > by intelligent but malevolent daemon). > *How do you distinguish mechanism, from materialism? I did deny the existence of any "substance" out there. It's likely the geometry of space that inhibits motion in certain directions, giving rise to the appearance of solidity and thus "matter". AG* > *Nor am I hiding the mind-body problem. I just have no clue as to the > resolution. AG* > > With mechanism, you need to reduce the physical laws to arithmetic. > Consciousness becomes more "easy", at least if you agree that consciousness > is true, non doubtable, non provable, and non expressible, as the logic of > machine self-reference > *Machine self reference? What the heck is that? AG* > explains why allo;;a[smachine are confronted to something obeying such > (semi-axiomatic) definition. The problem of matter appearance is solved in > the same way, leading quickly to the logic of the observable, and this > already justifies a quantum logic. It remains to compare it more with > nature, but up to now it fits rather well (both intuitively and formally). > Everett QM confirms Mechanism, but if you believe in a collapse, well, you > will need a non-mechanist theory of mind, à-la Penrose perhaps. > *"Collapse" is more likely a defacto placeholder for as-yet unknown dynamics. I don't like jumping to far-fetched conclusions of cascading metastasizing universes because we haven't resolved the measurement problem. Don't you find Joe the Plumber's power to create universes at will troubling? AG* Bruno > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
