> On 21 Feb 2018, at 20:40, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 2/21/2018 1:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I guess you mean enumerable here. I don’t see what physical bounds have to >> do with Church-Turing thesis, though. We laws suppose that the universal >> machine have potentially unbounded time and space (in the non physical >> computer science sense) available for them. > > But they are bounded in the physical sense, and not just potentially.
But Church-Turing thesis has nothing to do with physics or the physical sense. Then you don’t know if a machine, even in the physical world is bounded, unless you make special assumption on some existing universe. With mechanism, there are no evidence for a physical primary universe. We would have found one if we would have discover a serious discrepancy between the Nature’s physics and the physics in the “head of the number”, but we have tested this as far as possible, and found none. > So that must have consequences when saying yes to the doctor. Why? >> The mechanist answer to this is “yes”. The more you have neurons, the less >> conscious you are. > > Which is why mice are more conscious than you are and spiders are more > conscious than mice. Indeed. I know it is counter-intuitive, but we were warned by G*: it has to be counter-intuitive. A brain is more a filter of consciousness than a producer of consciousness, up to some point. This is not used in the derivation of physics, and is just something making the whole theory much more smooth. It is also confirmed (actually suggested) by the reports of the experimentation with some drugs, or of some near death experience. Even the belief in the induction axioms, which leads to Löbianity, seems to be like the beginning of the delusion. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.