> On 23 Feb 2018, at 23:15, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/23/2018 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> However though perhaps a spider may exist in a less filtered internal state 
>>> of being than a mouse, I don't see how it is more conscious. Is an amoeba 
>>> even more conscious then than a spider. Is the simplest most elementary 
>>> particle the most conscious entity of all?
>> Normally an amoeba is indeed more conscious than a spider, which is more 
>> conscious than us, but plausibly less conscious of their environment. The 
>> price of that higher consciousness is that it is of the dissociative kind of 
>> consciousness.
>> 
>> Particles are not conscious in the sense that particles have no brain at 
>> all, and actually, does not exist at all.
> 
> So your theory leads us to conclude that consciousness is maximized somewhere 
> between no neurons, even no structure at all, and the neural equipment of a 
> spider.   Perhaps a pebble?  

Pebbles? I don’t think so. A pebbles is not actually anything which exists 
ontologically, so that assuming that a pebble thinks is a bit attributing a 
mind to an illusion (the material things).

To make consciounsness manifest in the relative way, you need to be at the 
least Turing universal, so you need some amount of neurons or Turing 
equivalent. The empty theory is NOT conscious. Nor is the thermostat, in any 
sense sensible with mechanism. Amazingly, your laptop is, but in a dissociative 
state. It is important given that its consciousness is the same as yours, but 
much undifferentiated.



> 
> I find it disingenous that you talk of testing your theory by comparing with 
> experience and quantum mechanics and finding it agrees over a tiny part of 
> their domain and this is confirmation. 

It is not a tiny part, it is the core skeleton, and it is highly non trivial. 
Most of my real opponents bets that all the relevant modalities would collapse, 
making physics purely geographical, a bit like Smullyan sais explicitly in his 
book “Forever Undecided”.

I was expecting finding quick-kly the many-world aspect, but I got the formal 
logic of physics, not a long way from a theorem à-la Gleason. 

OK, it is not much, but it is the only theory which explain why there is a non 
trivial physics, and which explains consciousness. 



> But when your theory leads to an absurdity

Which one?



> you obfuscate the fact with mysticism and redefining consciousness as an 
> illusion…

This is disingenuous!  I am not sure why you say this. Since the start I insist 
that consciousness cannot be an illusion. You need to be conscious to be 
illusionned. Matter is an illusion. Not consciousness. (And by Matter I mean 
always Aristotle primary matter of the matter of the metaphysicians. Not the 
matter studied by the physicists, which on the contrary serves the verification 
procedure.




> although in other contexts you note it is the only thing we can be sure of.

I say this in all contexts. If you find a quote of me saying that consciousness 
is an illusion, I bought you a bottle of whisky!

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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