> On 10 Mar 2018, at 22:24, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/10/2018 12:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 8 Mar 2018, at 21:11, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/8/2018 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> On 7 Mar 2018, at 15:24, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 1:27 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>>>> On 3/5/2018 11:49 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 1:37 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 3/5/2018 9:14 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "Could" implies a question about possibilities.  It's certainly logically
>>>>>> possible that there not be such a disease as leukemia.  Is it 
>>>>>> nomologically
>>>>>> possible?...not as far as we know.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Well I'm not sure it's logically possible, for the reasons that Bruno
>>>>>> already addressed.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Bruno is assuming that everything not contrary to his theory exists
>>>>>> axiomatically...which is assuming the answer.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> That is a rather uncharitable way of putting it.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Bruno has discussed his Universal Dovetailer Argument extensively. If
>>>>>> you assume comp and accept the argument, then we are inside of the
>>>>>> dovetailer. The dovetailer is an everything-generator.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> That's exactly the problem with everythingism.  It predicts all the 
>>>>>> stuff we
>>>>>> don't see.
>>>>> Bruno, Russell, Tegmark and others tend to concern themselves a lot
>>>>> with why our experience of reality looks like it does on the face of
>>>>> everythingism. That is precisely the "hard part", no?
>>> They recognize that their theory doesn't account for it.  Tegmark makes 
>>> some anthropic speculations.  Bruno just says, 'I claim nothing, except 
>>> that mechanism and materialism are incompatible, and that the mind-body 
>>> problem is reduced into deriving physics from the “material” variants of 
>>> machine’s ideal rational believability/justifiability.'  It's not at all 
>>> clear to me that "reduced" in the appropriate verb...as though it is 
>>> simpler or more fundamental.  Even if you accept his step 7 it has only 
>>> "reduced" the problem to explaining the existence of physics and this 
>>> particular physics, from the assumption of arithmetic and the UD.
>> That is not completely correct. My theory is just digital mechanism (it is 
>> believed by 99,99% of scientists).
> 
> And 99.9% of scientists and mathematicians (who bother to think about it) 
> think that numbers and mathematics are just abstractions and do not exist in 
> the sense that tables and chairs exist.

I don’t think so. But I guess some majority might think this, without thinking 
to it much, and they can see the problem once grasping computationalism (and 
the mathematical definition of computation).

Yes, we are in the Aristotelian Era. Many believe in a primary physical 
universe. It is the main dogma of the religious institution, and we know that 
theology has yet got the chance to come back at the faculty if science. So 
majority argument on a fundamental matter must be used with caution.

Mechanism has been used by materialist to hide the mind-body problem, but with 
the digital form of mechanism, materialism lost its ability to explain even the 
appearance of matter, and becomes, in metaphysics, a sort of phlogiston.




> 
>>  The theorem is that physics is reduced to number theology entirely, making 
>> mechanism completely testable, and up to now confirmed by observation.
> 
> A bold claim.  But he "observations" seem trivial and are explainable on 
> other theories too.   A confirming observation is one that is predictive and 
> surprising.

You forget the UD Argument. The problem of relating first person and third 
person. Physicalism needs invisible horses to work with mechanism.




> 
>> The net gain is that we get the exact relationship between quanta and qualia 
>> (where physicalist just eliminate qualia or dismiss consciousness as an 
>> epiphenomenon, which it is not).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> It's my view that it may be simpler to explain physics and this physics and 
>>> consciousness from physics.
>> That would be circular, and not better than explaining God by assuming God, 
>> or Matter by assuming Matter, or consciousness, by assuming consciousness. 
>> That is equivalent with not trying to explain.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> So I could say the mind-body problem has been reduced to explaining 
>>> consciousness from physics...not even necessarily fundamental physics.
>> That explain 1/2 of the mind. That explains why we can attribute 
>> consciousness to our peers, but that fail to explain how my first person 
>> experience is contrived by this physical reality.
>> 
>> You have to explain what in the physical universe is capable of selecting 
>> the computations (arithmetical notion). If that thing is Turing emulable, 
>> then the physical cannot play a role,
> 
> That's false.  You implicitly and without proof or ever evidence assume that 
> mathematics, computation, and abstractions like numbers exist,

I have to assume them because the notion of computation needs them to be 
defined mathematically.

Now if you deny that the equation x + 1 = 2 has no solution, I have a problem, 
but I am pretty sure you agree that such a solution exist. 

After that, the reasoning show that assuming more existing things in the 
ontology cannot work.




> while denying that matter can exist without proof or evidence.


Of course. Extraordinary (ontological!) claim requires extraordinary evidences.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
>> if it is not Turing emulable, then I am OK, but out of my working 
>> hypothesis. The whole point is that this is testable, and today, only 
>> mechanism get a coherent relation between quanta and qualia (physics usually 
>> does not address that question, and physicalism has put the qualia question 
>> under the rug of its ontological commitment, made without any evidence).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>> It is the hard part of the matter problem, when we understand that with 
>>>> mechanism, the everything is no more that the sigma_1 arithmetical 
>>>> reality, which I think everyone believe in, except the ultra-intuitionist.
>>>> 
>>>> Brent seemed to have understood this once, but seems to forget it recently 
>>>> apparently.
>>>> 
>>>> If someone believe in a primal physical universe *and* in the survive of 
>>>> consciousness through the digital transformation, it is up to them to 
>>>> explain how the primal universe (and what is it?) acts on arithmetic for 
>>>> making some computations seems more real than others.
>>>> 
>>>> I claim nothing, except that mechanism and materialism are incompatible, 
>>>> and that the mind-body problem is reduced into deriving physics from the 
>>>> “material” variants of machine’s ideal rational 
>>>> believability/justifiability.
>>> Or why fewer than all arithmetical relations are realized in physics.
>> No, that is already explained by the difference between the eight 
>> phenomenological modes of self-references. The believable, knowable and 
>> observable obeys different logics which structure the arithmetical reality 
>> in completely different ways. Physics is a completely different mathematics 
>> than psychology.
>> Arithmetical relations are not realised in physics. Physics is more like a 
>> classifier of relative dreams in arithmetic.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>>> And then it works at the propositional level, so we can say that today, we 
>>>> have not yet detected any evidence for a primal universe through our 
>>>> observation of nature.
>>>> 
>>>> Let us encourage the pursue of the testing, simply.
>>>> 
>>>> Bruno
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