> On 6 Mar 2018, at 01:37, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 3/5/2018 9:14 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>> "Could" implies a question about possibilities. It's certainly logically
>>> possible that there not be such a disease as leukemia. Is it nomologically
>>> possible?...not as far as we know.
>> Well I'm not sure it's logically possible, for the reasons that Bruno
>> already addressed.
> Bruno is assuming that everything not contrary to his theory exists
> which is assuming the answer.
I recall that my assumption is only that the physical brain can be emulated at
some level by a digital physical machine so that we would survive in the usual
Then to just define “digital” we need to accept "very elementary arithmetic"
(like RA), but then, it is just impossible to use an assumption of primary
physicalness to select the computations in arithmetic. We need to select it by
the measure on the first person experiences, and this gives the first coherent
explanation of both consciousness and matter appearance, where physicists just
do not address this question since a long time.
My work says nothing about physics, but it shows that with Digital Mechanism in
*Metaphysics*, physicalism does not work.
> But why would you suppose that a world in which "Leukemia doesn't exist."
> would allow you derive a logical contradiction?
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