On 3/10/2018 12:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 8 Mar 2018, at 21:11, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/8/2018 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 7 Mar 2018, at 15:24, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 1:27 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/5/2018 11:49 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 1:37 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/5/2018 9:14 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
"Could" implies a question about possibilities. It's certainly logically
possible that there not be such a disease as leukemia. Is it nomologically
possible?...not as far as we know.
Well I'm not sure it's logically possible, for the reasons that Bruno
already addressed.
Bruno is assuming that everything not contrary to his theory exists
axiomatically...which is assuming the answer.
That is a rather uncharitable way of putting it.
Bruno has discussed his Universal Dovetailer Argument extensively. If
you assume comp and accept the argument, then we are inside of the
dovetailer. The dovetailer is an everything-generator.
That's exactly the problem with everythingism. It predicts all the stuff we
don't see.
Bruno, Russell, Tegmark and others tend to concern themselves a lot
with why our experience of reality looks like it does on the face of
everythingism. That is precisely the "hard part", no?
They recognize that their theory doesn't account for it. Tegmark makes some anthropic
speculations. Bruno just says, 'I claim nothing, except that mechanism and materialism are
incompatible, and that the mind-body problem is reduced into deriving physics from the “material”
variants of machine’s ideal rational believability/justifiability.' It's not at all clear to me
that "reduced" in the appropriate verb...as though it is simpler or more fundamental.
Even if you accept his step 7 it has only "reduced" the problem to explaining the
existence of physics and this particular physics, from the assumption of arithmetic and the UD.
That is not completely correct. My theory is just digital mechanism (it is
believed by 99,99% of scientists).
And 99.9% of scientists and mathematicians (who bother to think about
it) think that numbers and mathematics are just abstractions and do not
exist in the sense that tables and chairs exist.
The theorem is that physics is reduced to number theology entirely, making
mechanism completely testable, and up to now confirmed by observation.
A bold claim. But he "observations" seem trivial and are explainable on
other theories too. A confirming observation is one that is predictive
and surprising.
The net gain is that we get the exact relationship between quanta and qualia
(where physicalist just eliminate qualia or dismiss consciousness as an
epiphenomenon, which it is not).
It's my view that it may be simpler to explain physics and this physics and
consciousness from physics.
That would be circular, and not better than explaining God by assuming God, or
Matter by assuming Matter, or consciousness, by assuming consciousness. That is
equivalent with not trying to explain.
So I could say the mind-body problem has been reduced to explaining
consciousness from physics...not even necessarily fundamental physics.
That explain 1/2 of the mind. That explains why we can attribute consciousness
to our peers, but that fail to explain how my first person experience is
contrived by this physical reality.
You have to explain what in the physical universe is capable of selecting the
computations (arithmetical notion). If that thing is Turing emulable, then the
physical cannot play a role,
That's false. You implicitly and without proof or ever evidence assume
that mathematics, computation, and abstractions like numbers exist,
while denying that matter can exist without proof or evidence.
Brent
if it is not Turing emulable, then I am OK, but out of my working hypothesis.
The whole point is that this is testable, and today, only mechanism get a
coherent relation between quanta and qualia (physics usually does not address
that question, and physicalism has put the qualia question under the rug of its
ontological commitment, made without any evidence).
It is the hard part of the matter problem, when we understand that with
mechanism, the everything is no more that the sigma_1 arithmetical reality,
which I think everyone believe in, except the ultra-intuitionist.
Brent seemed to have understood this once, but seems to forget it recently
apparently.
If someone believe in a primal physical universe *and* in the survive of
consciousness through the digital transformation, it is up to them to explain
how the primal universe (and what is it?) acts on arithmetic for making some
computations seems more real than others.
I claim nothing, except that mechanism and materialism are incompatible, and
that the mind-body problem is reduced into deriving physics from the “material”
variants of machine’s ideal rational believability/justifiability.
Or why fewer than all arithmetical relations are realized in physics.
No, that is already explained by the difference between the eight
phenomenological modes of self-references. The believable, knowable and
observable obeys different logics which structure the arithmetical reality in
completely different ways. Physics is a completely different mathematics than
psychology.
Arithmetical relations are not realised in physics. Physics is more like a
classifier of relative dreams in arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
And then it works at the propositional level, so we can say that today, we have
not yet detected any evidence for a primal universe through our observation of
nature.
Let us encourage the pursue of the testing, simply.
Bruno
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