On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 4:57 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 7 Mar 2018, at 15:24, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote: >> >> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 1:27 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 3/5/2018 11:49 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 1:37 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> On 3/5/2018 9:14 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> "Could" implies a question about possibilities. It's certainly logically >>> possible that there not be such a disease as leukemia. Is it nomologically >>> possible?...not as far as we know. >>> >>> Well I'm not sure it's logically possible, for the reasons that Bruno >>> already addressed. >>> >>> >>> Bruno is assuming that everything not contrary to his theory exists >>> axiomatically...which is assuming the answer. >>> >>> That is a rather uncharitable way of putting it. >>> >>> Bruno has discussed his Universal Dovetailer Argument extensively. If >>> you assume comp and accept the argument, then we are inside of the >>> dovetailer. The dovetailer is an everything-generator. >>> >>> >>> That's exactly the problem with everythingism. It predicts all the stuff we >>> don't see. >> >> Bruno, Russell, Tegmark and others tend to concern themselves a lot >> with why our experience of reality looks like it does on the face of >> everythingism. That is precisely the "hard part", no? > > It is the hard part of the matter problem, when we understand that with > mechanism, the everything is no more that the sigma_1 arithmetical reality, > which I think everyone believe in, except the ultra-intuitionist. > > Brent seemed to have understood this once, but seems to forget it recently > apparently. > > If someone believe in a primal physical universe *and* in the survive of > consciousness through the digital transformation, it is up to them to explain > how the primal universe (and what is it?) acts on arithmetic for making some > computations seems more real than others. > > I claim nothing, except that mechanism and materialism are incompatible, and > that the mind-body problem is reduced into deriving physics from the > “material” variants of machine’s ideal rational believability/justifiability. > And then it works at the propositional level, so we can say that today, we > have not yet detected any evidence for a primal universe through our > observation of nature. > > Let us encourage the pursue of the testing, simply.
Bruno, can you expand a bit? If you had a big grant to pursue this research programme, what would you do? Telmo. > Bruno > > > > >> >>> Russell >>> proposes something similar in his book. Isn't the exploration of this >>> type of idea the original reason for this mailing list? That doesn't >>> mean that the idea is right, of course, but it does mean that one >>> should expect to not keep going around in circles without ever >>> reaching a more sophisticated level of engagement with such theories. >>> >>> >>> I'd be happy to engage a more sophisticated level. I've suggested several >>> times points on which Bruno's theory might have something to say about >>> physics or cognition: For example there is the discussion of whether QM is >>> epistemic (quantum bayesianism) or ontic (wave-function realism). There are >>> experiments that seem to show it's ontic, but only under the assumption that >>> experimenters agree on it...which seems to be an epistemic condition. Or >>> how about the past hypothesis; does the UD necessarily imply a universe that >>> in low entropy in the past...or is that just the definition of "past", in >>> which case one asks why does the AoT have a consistent direction. And what >>> is the relation of the brain to the computational processes producing >>> consciousness? Why the delay in the Gray Walter experiment? Is there >>> really some number of neurons between platyhelmenthies and homo sapiens that >>> maximizes consciousness? >> >> Ok, me too. I feel that lack of moderation on the list makes it >> difficult -- although I am not advocating it. >> It's hard to talk over certain megaphones, and I think many give up. >> >>> >>> But why would you suppose that a world in which "Leukemia doesn't exist." >>> would allow you derive a logical contradiction? >>> >>> I think such a world would require one to accept something like >>> creationism as logically consistent. The process of biological >>> complexification happens by natural selection. Natural selection, by >>> definition, implies failure modes. It also leads to endless >>> competitive and exploitative dynamics such as predators, pathogens, >>> parasites, etc. Avoiding all of these tragedies from the perspective >>> of human beings would require a designer holding human interests at >>> heart above everything else. Both the pre-existence of such a designer >>> and its motivation to helps us above everything else seem nonsensical >>> to me. >>> >>> >>> First, you are appealing to biology and physics, not logic. >> >> I am appealing to logic, because I am claiming that we must discard >> scenarios where the arrow of complexity is reversed. That is to say: a >> complex phenomena entailing an even more complex entity than what is >> being explained. >> >>> I already said >>> that nomologically, leukemia was probably necessary. It's just a possible >>> mutation in bone marrow cells. But there's no logical contradiction in that >>> mutation not occuring. >> >> No, but there is a logic contradiction in no mutations ever occurring, >> unless you can provide an alternative theory to natural selection that >> does not revert the arrow of complexity. >> >>> Second, you're straw manning. I didn' t say >>> anything about "failure modes" not existing. I said that one particular >>> failure mode could fail to exist. In fact I'd say the world would be better >>> if even that one little girl had not died in pain. Let's see you prove that >>> implies a logical contradiction. >> >> I would say that it really depends on weather QM is epistemic or >> ontic, as you say above. Or: everythingism allows for an entity that >> fits Anselm's argument. >> >> Telmo. >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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