On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, 20 Mar 2018 at 7:57 pm, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 1:03 AM, Bruce Kellett >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> > From: Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >> > >> > >> > On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:06 AM, Bruce Kellett >> > <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> >> >> >> >> >> It is possible that consciousness is fully preserved until a threshold >> >> is >> >> reached then suddenly disappears. So if half the subject’s brain is >> >> replaced, he behaves normally and has normal consciousness, but if one >> >> more >> >> neurone is replaced he continues to behave normally but becomes a >> >> zombie. >> >> Moreover, since neurones are themselves complex systems it could be >> >> broken >> >> down further: half of that final neurone could be replaced with no >> >> change >> >> to >> >> consciousness, but when a particular membrane protein is replaced with >> >> a >> >> non-biological nanomachine the subject will suddenly become a zombie. >> >> And >> >> we >> >> need not stop here, because this protein molecule could also be >> >> replaced >> >> gradually, for example by non-biological radioisotopes. If half the >> >> atoms >> >> in >> >> this protein are replaced, there is no change in behaviour and no >> >> change >> >> in >> >> consciousness; but when one more atom is replaced a threshold is >> >> reached >> >> and >> >> the subject suddenly loses consciousness. So zombification could turn >> >> on >> >> the >> >> addition or subtraction of one neutron. Are you prepared to go this far >> >> to >> >> challenge the idea that if the observable behaviour of the brain is >> >> replicated, consciousness will also be replicated? >> >> >> >> >> >> If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is >> >> replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear >> >> corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable >> >> behaviour. >> > >> > For this to be a theory in the scientific sense, one needs some way to >> > detect consciousness. In that case your corollary becomes a tautology: >> > >> > (a) If one can detect consciousness then one can detect consciousness. >> > >> > The other option is to assume that observable behaviors in the brain >> > imply consciousness -- because "common sense", because experts say so, >> > whatever. In this case it becomes circular reasoning: >> > >> > (b) Assuming that observable behaviors in the brain imply >> > consciousness, consciousness can be inferred from brain behaviors. >> > >> > >> > I was responding to the claim by Stathis that consciousness will follow >> > replication of observable behaviour. It seemed to me that this was >> > proposed >> > as a theory: "If the observable behaviour of is replicated then >> > consciousness will also be replicated." >> >> Lawrence is proposing that something specific about the brain might be >> necessary for consciousness to arise. He proposed a scenario where >> parts of the brain are replaced with a computer, and behavior is >> maintained while consciousness is lost (p-zombie). Stathis is >> proposing a thought experiment that attempts reductio ad absurdum on >> this scenario. Although this is all interesting speculation, there is >> no scientific theory, because there is no way to perform an >> experiment, because there is no scientific instrument that detects >> consciousness. In the end I still don't know, as scientific fact, if >> others are conscious. > > > The interesting thing is that you can draw conclusions about consciousness > without being able to define it or detect it.
I agree. > The claim is that IF an entity > is conscious THEN its consciousness will be preserved if brain function is > preserved despite changing the brain substrate. Ok, this is computationalism. I also bet on computationalism, but I think we must proceed with caution and not forget that we are just assuming this to be true. Your thought experiment is convincing but is not a proof. You do expose something that I agree with: that non-computationalism sounds silly. Telmo. >> You were the first to call it a theory, and this is why I reacted. >> >> > I was merely pointing out >> > consequences of this theory, so your claims of tautology and/or >> > circularity >> > rather miss the point: the consequences of any theory are either >> > tautologies >> > or circularities in that sense, because they are implications of the >> > theory. >> >> Tautologies are fine indeed. I did not call (a) a tautology as an >> insult, merely to point out that the hard part is still missing, and >> that assuming that it is solved does not lead to anywhere interesting. >> >> Circularities are, of course, not fine. You cannot assume that you can >> infer consciousness from behavior, and that use this assumption to >> conclude that you can infer consciousness from behavior. >> >> > Now it may be that you want to reject Stathis's calim, and insist that >> > consciousness cannot be inferred from behaviour. But it seems to me that >> > that theory is as lacking in independent verification as the contrary. >> >> Again, no theory. I am just stating the simple fact that, since there >> is no known instrument so far that can detect consciousness in the 3p, >> then it is not possible to propose scientific theories about >> consciousness at the moment. Only conjectures. >> >> If you want my conjecture: I assume that all living things are >> conscious. If you show me an AI that behaves like a human being (or >> even a dog) I will assume it's conscious too. But none of this is >> science. >> >> I strongly suspect that consciousness is something that cannot, in >> fact, be studied by science -- because consciousness is what does >> science. It's like asking you to look inside your eyeballs. >> >> >> Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other >> >> people >> >> as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p >> >> distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is >> >> "certainly >> >> certain". >> >> But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other >> >> things can be as certain as 1p experiences..... >> > >> > If one can detect 1p experiences then one can detect 1p experiences... >> > >> > >> > The claim has more content than that. >> >> I don't see how. >> >> Telmo. >> >> > Bruce >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > Telmo. >> > >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> > an >> > email to [email protected]. >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
