On Tue, 20 Mar 2018 at 7:57 pm, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 1:03 AM, Bruce Kellett > <[email protected]> wrote: > > From: Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > > > > > > On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:06 AM, Bruce Kellett > > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > >> > >> > >> It is possible that consciousness is fully preserved until a threshold > is > >> reached then suddenly disappears. So if half the subject’s brain is > >> replaced, he behaves normally and has normal consciousness, but if one > >> more > >> neurone is replaced he continues to behave normally but becomes a > zombie. > >> Moreover, since neurones are themselves complex systems it could be > broken > >> down further: half of that final neurone could be replaced with no > change > >> to > >> consciousness, but when a particular membrane protein is replaced with a > >> non-biological nanomachine the subject will suddenly become a zombie. > And > >> we > >> need not stop here, because this protein molecule could also be replaced > >> gradually, for example by non-biological radioisotopes. If half the > atoms > >> in > >> this protein are replaced, there is no change in behaviour and no change > >> in > >> consciousness; but when one more atom is replaced a threshold is reached > >> and > >> the subject suddenly loses consciousness. So zombification could turn on > >> the > >> addition or subtraction of one neutron. Are you prepared to go this far > to > >> challenge the idea that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > >> replicated, consciousness will also be replicated? > >> > >> > >> If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > >> replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear > >> corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable > behaviour. > > > > For this to be a theory in the scientific sense, one needs some way to > > detect consciousness. In that case your corollary becomes a tautology: > > > > (a) If one can detect consciousness then one can detect consciousness. > > > > The other option is to assume that observable behaviors in the brain > > imply consciousness -- because "common sense", because experts say so, > > whatever. In this case it becomes circular reasoning: > > > > (b) Assuming that observable behaviors in the brain imply > > consciousness, consciousness can be inferred from brain behaviors. > > > > > > I was responding to the claim by Stathis that consciousness will follow > > replication of observable behaviour. It seemed to me that this was > proposed > > as a theory: "If the observable behaviour of is replicated then > > consciousness will also be replicated." > > Lawrence is proposing that something specific about the brain might be > necessary for consciousness to arise. He proposed a scenario where > parts of the brain are replaced with a computer, and behavior is > maintained while consciousness is lost (p-zombie). Stathis is > proposing a thought experiment that attempts reductio ad absurdum on > this scenario. Although this is all interesting speculation, there is > no scientific theory, because there is no way to perform an > experiment, because there is no scientific instrument that detects > consciousness. In the end I still don't know, as scientific fact, if > others are conscious. The interesting thing is that you can draw conclusions about consciousness without being able to define it or detect it. The claim is that IF an entity is conscious THEN its consciousness will be preserved if brain function is preserved despite changing the brain substrate. You were the first to call it a theory, and this is why I reacted. > > > I was merely pointing out > > consequences of this theory, so your claims of tautology and/or > circularity > > rather miss the point: the consequences of any theory are either > tautologies > > or circularities in that sense, because they are implications of the > theory. > > Tautologies are fine indeed. I did not call (a) a tautology as an > insult, merely to point out that the hard part is still missing, and > that assuming that it is solved does not lead to anywhere interesting. > > Circularities are, of course, not fine. You cannot assume that you can > infer consciousness from behavior, and that use this assumption to > conclude that you can infer consciousness from behavior. > > > Now it may be that you want to reject Stathis's calim, and insist that > > consciousness cannot be inferred from behaviour. But it seems to me that > > that theory is as lacking in independent verification as the contrary. > > Again, no theory. I am just stating the simple fact that, since there > is no known instrument so far that can detect consciousness in the 3p, > then it is not possible to propose scientific theories about > consciousness at the moment. Only conjectures. > > If you want my conjecture: I assume that all living things are > conscious. If you show me an AI that behaves like a human being (or > even a dog) I will assume it's conscious too. But none of this is > science. > > I strongly suspect that consciousness is something that cannot, in > fact, be studied by science -- because consciousness is what does > science. It's like asking you to look inside your eyeballs. > > >> Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other > >> people > >> as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p > >> distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is > "certainly > >> certain". > >> But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other > >> things can be as certain as 1p experiences..... > > > > If one can detect 1p experiences then one can detect 1p experiences... > > > > > > The claim has more content than that. > > I don't see how. > > Telmo. > > > Bruce > > > > > > > > > > Telmo. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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