> On 20 Mar 2018, at 06:46, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Tue, 20 Mar 2018 at 10:09 am, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > >> >> It is possible that consciousness is fully preserved until a threshold is >> reached then suddenly disappears. So if half the subject’s brain is >> replaced, he behaves normally and has normal consciousness, but if one more >> neurone is replaced he continues to behave normally but becomes a zombie. >> Moreover, since neurones are themselves complex systems it could be broken >> down further: half of that final neurone could be replaced with no change to >> consciousness, but when a particular membrane protein is replaced with a >> non-biological nanomachine the subject will suddenly become a zombie. And we >> need not stop here, because this protein molecule could also be replaced >> gradually, for example by non-biological radioisotopes. If half the atoms in >> this protein are replaced, there is no change in behaviour and no change in >> consciousness; but when one more atom is replaced a threshold is reached and >> the subject suddenly loses consciousness. So zombification could turn on the >> addition or subtraction of one neutron. Are you prepared to go this far to >> challenge the idea that if the observable behaviour of the brain is >> replicated, consciousness will also be replicated? > > If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is replicated, > then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear corollary is that > consciousness can be inferred from observable behaviour. Which implies that I > can be as certain of the consciousness of other people as I am of my own. > This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p distinctions that > computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is "certainly certain". But if I > can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other things can be as > certain as 1p experiences.... > > You can’t reliable infer consciousness in others. What you can infer is that > whatever consciousness an entity has, it will be preserved if functionally > identical substitutions in its brain are made. You can’t know if a mouse is > conscious, but you can know that if mouse neurones are replaced with > functionally identical electronic neurones its behaviour will be the same and > any consciousness it may have will also be the same.
Assuming the neuronal level for the substitution level, but some like Hameroff will require the copy made at the level of the tubulins, other will ask for the quantum states, and some will just accept the neuronal + glial cells, as they seem to play a role in pain. We cannot know our machine level, but we can bet, and we can believe (correctly or wrongly) having survived. It is arguable that molecular biology gives some weight to the idea that “nature has already bet” on Mechanism, as we replace our stuff all the time. Bruno > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
