> On 20 Mar 2018, at 17:03, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 7:06 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > > replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear > > corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable behaviour. > Yes. > > > Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other people > > as I am of my own. > No. The idea that consciousness can be inferred from intelligent behavior is > an axiom of existence, it has no proof and will never have a proof but it > sure seems like its true, and every sane human being uses it every hour of > their waking life. And there is always a element of doubt in real life, or at > least there should be, so something need not provide absolute certainty to be > enormously useful. As for my own consciousness I don’t have a proof of that > either but I don’t need one because I’ve got the one thing that can pull rank > even over proof, direct experience. > > > This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p distinctions > Bruno’s the one who started pushing that ridiculous phrase, I suppose he > thought it sounded more profound erudite and scientific than “the difference > between you and me”. And I would maintain nobody outside a looney bin has > difficulty finding the "1p/1pp/3p distinction”. > >
Yes, I teach this since year, and nobody has ever have any difficulty in understanding this, including the first person indeterminacy. Problems raised are in step 7 and 8, which are more demanding in mathematical logic, as they need to understand that Very Elementary Arithmetic (Peano Arithmetic *without* induction) is already Turing complete. This is known (by logicians) since the 1930. Bruno > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
