> On 19 Mar 2018, at 10:58, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Sunday, March 18, 2018 at 8:46:26 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: > > > On 19 March 2018 at 12:14, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > On Sunday, March 18, 2018 at 3:51:13 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 11:02 AM, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] > <>> wrote: > > > The MH spacetimes have Cauchy horizons that because they pile up geodesics > > can be a sort of singularity. > > That’s not the only thing they have, MH spacetimes also have closed timelike > curves and logical paradoxes produced by them, one of them being the one > found by Turing. They also have naked singularities that nobody has ever seen > the slightest hint of. And if you need to go to as exotic a place as the > speculative interior of a Black Hole to find a reason why Cryonics might not > work I am greatly encouraged. > > Not all MH spaces have closed timelike curves. > > > > The subject of NP-completeness came up because of my conjecture about there > > being a sort of code associated with a conscious entity that is not > > computable or if computable is intractable in NP. > > NP-completeness is sorta weird and consciousness is sorta weird, but other > than that is there any reason to think the two things are related? > > This seems to be something you are not registering. Classic NP-complete > problems involve cataloging subgraphs and determining the rules for all > subgraphs in a graph. There are other similar combinatoric problems that are > NP complete. A map from a brain to a computer is going to require knowing how > to handle these problems. Quantum computers do not help much. > > > > It could have some bearing on the ability to emulate consciousness in a > > computer. > > How do you figure that? Both my brain and my computer are made of matter that > obeys the laws of physics, and matter that obeys the laws of physics has > never been observed to compute NP-complete problems in polynomial time, much > less less find the answer to a non-computable question, like “what is the > 7918th Busy Beaver number?”. > > And for this reason it could be impossible to map brain states into a > computer and capture a person completely. Of course brains and computers are > made of matter.
Physical brains and physical computer are made of matter, but matter is only an appearance for the computer and brain which are emulated by the number relations. Many here seems to believe in Aristotle primary matter, which I can explain to be logically incompatible with (Digital) Mechanism. You can’t have both some primary matter playing a role in consciousness and Digital Mechanism. And there has never been the slightest evidence for the existence of primary matter. On the contrary contemporary physics seems to confirms, intuitively and formally the immaterialist consequences of Digital Mechanism. The quantum is only the digital seen from inside, or from the self-referential mode of the numbers (the hypostases []p & ~[]f, or even []p & p on p sigma_1 (= semi-computable). With mechanism, consciousness is far easier to explain than matter. Consciousness is only the truth when it intersect the belief in a reality. That makes it true, undoubtable (and thus known), but also non-justifiable, nor definable. All universal numbers have it, and the computations does not create it. The computation’s role is only in channeling the differentiation of the consciousness attached to the universal entities. NP completeness is a red herring here. The busy beaver function is just an exemple of a non computable (yet universal) functions. There are tuns of other non computable function, like basically all attribute of (universal or not) digital machines. Bruno PS heavy teaching period, sorry for the delays. > So is a pile of shit also made of matter. Based on what we know about > bacteria and their network communicating by electrical potentials the pile of > shit may have more in the way of consciousness than a computer. > > As for the rest I think a lot of this sort of idea is chasing after some > crazy dream. There is in some ways a problem with doing that. As things stand > now I would not do the upload. Below is a picture of some aspect of this. > > <https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-B42zD6RjTlo/Wq8Or4mWXiI/AAAAAAAADSs/rSPOyS5rTfwkhdWkws8ll7Huj6DVNHMqgCLcBGAs/s1600/Why%2Bis%2Bthe%2Bdog%2Bhappier.png> > Could you say if you think the observable behaviour of the brain (and hence > of the person whose muscles are controlled by the brain) could be replaced by > a computer, and, if the answer is yes, if you still think it is possible that > the consciousness might not be preserved? And if the answer is also yes to > the second question, what you think it would be like if your consciousness > was changed by replacing part of your brain, but your brain still forced your > body to behave in the same way? > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > I really do not know. I will say if it is possible in principle to replace > the executive parts of the brain with a computer, but where the result could > be a sort of zombie. There are too many unknowns and unknowns with no > Bayesian priors, or unknown unknowns. We are in a domain of possibles, > plausibles and maybe a Jupiter computer-brain. There is so little to go with > this, and to be honest a lot more possible obstructions I might see than > realities, that almost nothing can be said with much certainty. > > LC > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
