> On 20 Mar 2018, at 17:52, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, March 20, 2018 at 3:57:31 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: > On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 1:03 AM, Bruce Kellett > <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > From: Telmo Menezes <[email protected] <javascript:>> > > > > > > On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:06 AM, Bruce Kellett > > <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > >> From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] <javascript:>> > >> > >> > >> It is possible that consciousness is fully preserved until a threshold is > >> reached then suddenly disappears. So if half the subject’s brain is > >> replaced, he behaves normally and has normal consciousness, but if one > >> more > >> neurone is replaced he continues to behave normally but becomes a zombie. > >> Moreover, since neurones are themselves complex systems it could be broken > >> down further: half of that final neurone could be replaced with no change > >> to > >> consciousness, but when a particular membrane protein is replaced with a > >> non-biological nanomachine the subject will suddenly become a zombie. And > >> we > >> need not stop here, because this protein molecule could also be replaced > >> gradually, for example by non-biological radioisotopes. If half the atoms > >> in > >> this protein are replaced, there is no change in behaviour and no change > >> in > >> consciousness; but when one more atom is replaced a threshold is reached > >> and > >> the subject suddenly loses consciousness. So zombification could turn on > >> the > >> addition or subtraction of one neutron. Are you prepared to go this far to > >> challenge the idea that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > >> replicated, consciousness will also be replicated? > >> > >> > >> If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > >> replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear > >> corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable behaviour. > > > > For this to be a theory in the scientific sense, one needs some way to > > detect consciousness. In that case your corollary becomes a tautology: > > > > (a) If one can detect consciousness then one can detect consciousness. > > > > The other option is to assume that observable behaviors in the brain > > imply consciousness -- because "common sense", because experts say so, > > whatever. In this case it becomes circular reasoning: > > > > (b) Assuming that observable behaviors in the brain imply > > consciousness, consciousness can be inferred from brain behaviors. > > > > > > I was responding to the claim by Stathis that consciousness will follow > > replication of observable behaviour. It seemed to me that this was proposed > > as a theory: "If the observable behaviour of is replicated then > > consciousness will also be replicated." > > Lawrence is proposing that something specific about the brain might be > necessary for consciousness to arise. He proposed a scenario where > parts of the brain are replaced with a computer, and behavior is > maintained while consciousness is lost (p-zombie). Stathis is > proposing a thought experiment that attempts reductio ad absurdum on > this scenario. Although this is all interesting speculation, there is > no scientific theory, because there is no way to perform an > experiment, because there is no scientific instrument that detects > consciousness. In the end I still don't know, as scientific fact, if > others are conscious. > > You were the first to call it a theory, and this is why I reacted. > > My point is actually empirical. The claim is that this can be done, which > means experiments will be done. If so then we might ask, "What can go wrong > with that?" > > My point is that to load my brain states into a computer requires some > process for measuring and cataloging the neural nets in my brain. Processes > such as computing subsets of combinatorial processes are NP-complete.
Why? I don’t see that at all. A copy can be done in lear time, once we have the right technology. The hippocampus of the rat have been copied, and some brain worms also, with some partial success. Personally I would ask a copy at the atomic level; just above Heisenberg uncertainty, in case I am forced to say “yes” to some doctor. > This will form some limit on this claim, and it could be a fundamental > barrier. Duplication is not possible either, for a complete duplicate on the > fine grain quantum scale involves quantum cloning that is not a quantum > process. A lot of this discussion involves rubbing the philosopher's stone, > when in fact this would be a whole lot more difficult to actually do. Note that we are actually copied or prepared (in the quantum sense) infinitely often in arithmetic, and only that counts to understand that if Mechanism is true, then physics becomes a branch of machine theology, which is itself a branch of arithmetic. Bruno > > LC > > > > > > I was merely pointing out > > consequences of this theory, so your claims of tautology and/or circularity > > rather miss the point: the consequences of any theory are either > > tautologies > > or circularities in that sense, because they are implications of the > > theory. > > Tautologies are fine indeed. I did not call (a) a tautology as an > insult, merely to point out that the hard part is still missing, and > that assuming that it is solved does not lead to anywhere interesting. > > Circularities are, of course, not fine. You cannot assume that you can > infer consciousness from behavior, and that use this assumption to > conclude that you can infer consciousness from behavior. > > > Now it may be that you want to reject Stathis's calim, and insist that > > consciousness cannot be inferred from behaviour. But it seems to me that > > that theory is as lacking in independent verification as the contrary. > > Again, no theory. I am just stating the simple fact that, since there > is no known instrument so far that can detect consciousness in the 3p, > then it is not possible to propose scientific theories about > consciousness at the moment. Only conjectures. > > If you want my conjecture: I assume that all living things are > conscious. If you show me an AI that behaves like a human being (or > even a dog) I will assume it's conscious too. But none of this is > science. > > I strongly suspect that consciousness is something that cannot, in > fact, be studied by science -- because consciousness is what does > science. It's like asking you to look inside your eyeballs. > > >> Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other > >> people > >> as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p > >> distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is "certainly > >> certain". > >> But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other > >> things can be as certain as 1p experiences..... > > > > If one can detect 1p experiences then one can detect 1p experiences... > > > > > > The claim has more content than that. > > I don't see how. > > Telmo. > > > Bruce > > > > > > > > > > Telmo. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > > <javascript:>. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
