On 3/20/2018 9:52 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Tuesday, March 20, 2018 at 3:57:31 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 1:03 AM, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
> From: Telmo Menezes <[email protected] <javascript:>>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:06 AM, Bruce Kellett
> <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
>> From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] <javascript:>>
>>
>>
>> It is possible that consciousness is fully preserved until a
threshold is
>> reached then suddenly disappears. So if half the subject’s
brain is
>> replaced, he behaves normally and has normal consciousness, but
if one
>> more
>> neurone is replaced he continues to behave normally but becomes
a zombie.
>> Moreover, since neurones are themselves complex systems it
could be broken
>> down further: half of that final neurone could be replaced with
no change
>> to
>> consciousness, but when a particular membrane protein is
replaced with a
>> non-biological nanomachine the subject will suddenly become a
zombie. And
>> we
>> need not stop here, because this protein molecule could also be
replaced
>> gradually, for example by non-biological radioisotopes. If half
the atoms
>> in
>> this protein are replaced, there is no change in behaviour and
no change
>> in
>> consciousness; but when one more atom is replaced a threshold
is reached
>> and
>> the subject suddenly loses consciousness. So zombification
could turn on
>> the
>> addition or subtraction of one neutron. Are you prepared to go
this far to
>> challenge the idea that if the observable behaviour of the
brain is
>> replicated, consciousness will also be replicated?
>>
>>
>> If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is
>> replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then
the clear
>> corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable
behaviour.
>
> For this to be a theory in the scientific sense, one needs some
way to
> detect consciousness. In that case your corollary becomes a
tautology:
>
> (a) If one can detect consciousness then one can detect
consciousness.
>
> The other option is to assume that observable behaviors in the
brain
> imply consciousness -- because "common sense", because experts
say so,
> whatever. In this case it becomes circular reasoning:
>
> (b) Assuming that observable behaviors in the brain imply
> consciousness, consciousness can be inferred from brain behaviors.
>
>
> I was responding to the claim by Stathis that consciousness will
follow
> replication of observable behaviour. It seemed to me that this
was proposed
> as a theory: "If the observable behaviour of is replicated then
> consciousness will also be replicated."
Lawrence is proposing that something specific about the brain
might be
necessary for consciousness to arise. He proposed a scenario where
parts of the brain are replaced with a computer, and behavior is
maintained while consciousness is lost (p-zombie). Stathis is
proposing a thought experiment that attempts reductio ad absurdum on
this scenario. Although this is all interesting speculation, there is
no scientific theory, because there is no way to perform an
experiment, because there is no scientific instrument that detects
consciousness. In the end I still don't know, as scientific fact, if
others are conscious.
You were the first to call it a theory, and this is why I reacted.
My point is actually empirical. The claim is that this can be done,
which means experiments will be done. If so then we might ask, "What
can go wrong with that?"
My point is that to load my brain states into a computer requires some
process for measuring and cataloging the neural nets in my brain.
That's one possible way. But another would be to simply create
artificial neurons with the same connectivity...the 3D analog of copying
a map with a Xerox copier...no measuring and cataloging needed. It
might someday be possible using a kind of 3D printer working from
high-resolution MRIs of your brain.
Brent
Processes such as computing subsets of combinatorial processes are
NP-complete. This will form some limit on this claim, and it could be
a fundamental barrier. Duplication is not possible either, for a
complete duplicate on the fine grain quantum scale involves quantum
cloning that is not a quantum process. A lot of this discussion
involves rubbing the philosopher's stone, when in fact this would be a
whole lot more difficult to actually do.
LC
> I was merely pointing out
> consequences of this theory, so your claims of tautology and/or
circularity
> rather miss the point: the consequences of any theory are either
tautologies
> or circularities in that sense, because they are implications of
the theory.
Tautologies are fine indeed. I did not call (a) a tautology as an
insult, merely to point out that the hard part is still missing, and
that assuming that it is solved does not lead to anywhere
interesting.
Circularities are, of course, not fine. You cannot assume that you
can
infer consciousness from behavior, and that use this assumption to
conclude that you can infer consciousness from behavior.
> Now it may be that you want to reject Stathis's calim, and
insist that
> consciousness cannot be inferred from behaviour. But it seems to
me that
> that theory is as lacking in independent verification as the
contrary.
Again, no theory. I am just stating the simple fact that, since there
is no known instrument so far that can detect consciousness in the
3p,
then it is not possible to propose scientific theories about
consciousness at the moment. Only conjectures.
If you want my conjecture: I assume that all living things are
conscious. If you show me an AI that behaves like a human being (or
even a dog) I will assume it's conscious too. But none of this is
science.
I strongly suspect that consciousness is something that cannot, in
fact, be studied by science -- because consciousness is what does
science. It's like asking you to look inside your eyeballs.
>> Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of
other
>> people
>> as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p
>> distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is
"certainly
>> certain".
>> But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other
>> things can be as certain as 1p experiences.....
>
> If one can detect 1p experiences then one can detect 1p
experiences...
>
>
> The claim has more content than that.
I don't see how.
Telmo.
> Bruce
>
>
>
>
> Telmo.
>
>
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