> On 28 May 2018, at 21:06, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/28/2018 6:08 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> 2018-05-28 14:54 GMT+02:00 <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>>: >> >> >> On Monday, May 28, 2018 at 11:49:49 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 26 May 2018, at 22:56, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, May 26, 2018 at 9:56:39 AM UTC, scerir wrote: >>> Aristotle distinguishes two aspects of ordinary things: form and matter. >>> >>> Form only exists when it enforms matter. Matter is just potential to be >>> enformed. >>> >>> Aristotle identifies matter with potentiality, form with actuality. >>> >>> "For, as we said, word substance has three meanings, form, matter, and the >>> complex of both and of these three, what is called matter is potentiality, >>> what is called form actuality." (De Anima, II) >>> (According to Heisenberg wavefunctions are "potentialities", at least >>> before measurements). >>> >>> Bruno exudes extreme aversion to "primary matter”, >> >> >> Not at all. >> >> I just show that the assumption of primary matter contradicts the assumption >> of mechanism (that is not obvious and requires some work). Mechanism is >> incompatible with (weak) Materailsm (the belief that there is some >> ontologically primitive/irreducible matter). >> >> What is "primary matter"? AG >> >> Simply matter as an ontological primitive... >> >> ie: irreducible to something else, which is the base of reality. >> >> Quentin > > The interesting question is, if it's the ur-stuff of reality in what sense is > it "matter", isn't it everything.
Matter is usually defined by the object studied in physics, which means “observable”, or “measurable”. That type of things you can knock on. It becomes primary when you think that such matter can explain everything, including consciousness. But with mechanism, it cannot be everything——in fact, it cannot be anything, but a subjective appearance in numbers relative experiences. It is but one mode of arithmetic when scrutinising itself. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
