On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 12:31 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:


​> ​
> The 1p-you is defined by the sequence of memories personally accessible
>

​
That does not define a unique object if the world contains 1p-you
duplicating machines as it does in your thought experiment
​, therefore it is nonsensical to ask what one and ony one thing will "you"
see or feel. If you claim the ​
1p-you
​ can not be duplicated then ​there must be some subjective difference
between the two,
but we know there is not because they can't ever tell which one they are,
the copy or the original.



> ​> ​
> like the personal diary
>

​
If the 1p-you can be duplicated ( and can be because there is no way to
know if "you" are the copy or the original because both have identical
subjective experiences) then it can certainly duplicate a  diary. That's
why the entire diary business is so dumb.


> ​> ​
> *I remind you that your argument that in the two situations the
> doppelgängers have different chance to meet, is not relevant, or just add
> in the thought experience that someone has build a an unbridgeable wall
> between Washington and Moscow.*
>

​
If the laws of physics work the way we think they do then I can never meet
my Everett style doppelganger even in principle, but I can if my
doppelganger was made in a 1p-you duplicating machine as it was in your
thought experiment. A thing like a unbridgeable wall between Washington and
Moscow is tantamount to postulating a new law of physics, and there is no
evidence such a law exists or any reason to even suspect that it does in
order to explain experimental results. So in summary if physics were
different
​then​
 you could be right, but it isn't and you're not.

​ ​
John K Clark

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