> On 1 Jun 2018, at 19:52, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 1, 2018 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >>> The 1p-you is defined by the sequence of memories personally accessible > > >> That does not define a unique object if the world contains 1p-you > >> duplicating machines as it does in your thought experiment , > > >How could that be possible? > That is a very odd question for a scientifically minded person to ask, very > odd indeed. If you believe that is not possible then you must believe the > most important part of us is supernatural and can not be duplicated because > it is not amenable to the scientific method or even to logic. In other words > you believe in the soul. If I believed in crap like that I’d burn all my > scientific books get some saffron robes and join a monastery or something. > >
No. It means that you have a criteria to distinguish undistinguishable state. You said your self that two identical brains located at two places simultaneously will process one consciousness. Yes, I believe in the soul, because it is defined by the conscious owner of the unique personal diary, or memories. The soul is the greek original way to point on the first person experience. > > After iterating 10 times the duplication, each 1p person is unique, > They would only be unique if the duplication machine was bad or if the > environments they were in was different and there was sufficient time for > then to diverge. > > Not at all. The diverge when they open the door nd see in which city they are. You said yourself very recently in this thread, and also before, that when the door of the reconstitution box, is not open, the consciousness is unique > > with its definite history in the diary (like 1000110110). > > If I can be duplicated then 1000110110 can be too, Of course. > hell technology is good enough to to that right now. That’s why the entire > diary business you keep talking about is so dumb. You are avoiding the though experience. Let us consider that “1” corresponds to “I measure where I feel to be, and see Washington” and “0” if not. The H-guy survives in both cities, but once they both open the door, one of them has to write 1 is the diary, and the other one has to write 0. Then they come back by usual plane, still with their diary, and do the experience again. After that we have 4 “H-Guys”, one with the history 11 in his diary, one with 10, one with 01, and one with 00. The H-guy could have guess that this is what happen, and that any attempt to predict a certain definite outcome of that sequence of self-localisation would be refuted by all the others. > > >> therefore it is nonsensical to ask what one and ony one thing will "you" > >> see or feel. If you claim the 1p-you can not be duplicated then there must > >> be some subjective difference between the two, but we know there is not > >> because they can't ever tell which one they are, the copy or the original. > > > They can each tell who they are among the 2^10. > > I don't see how. > ? By consulting their diaries, or their personal memories. I don’t see how you don’t see that. > In fact if the duplicating machine was working properly and the environments > were the same then there wouldn’t even be a “they”, there wouldn’t be 2^10 > conscious beings, they would all be identical so there would only be one. > > In helsinki, the guy knows that he will open the door, and get a definite result. He just cannot be sure of which one. > > > They have become different but they are all the original. > Then time must have passed and you must of put them in different environments. > Washington and Moscow seem to me rather different environments. > Either that or you haven't been performing proper maintenance on the > duplicating machine and it is malfunctioning. > > > Of course the diary can be duplicated. That is the whole point > Then I’ll be damned if I know what “the whole point” is. > > To show that in a self-duplication experience of the type described, it is impossible to predict among the answers W and M, or 1 and 0, which one will occur, despite with computationalism we strive at both places. The thereupon is that at both place, the survivor feels to be unique in one place (or mechanism is wrong, or the door did not choose the right level, etc.). > > but it contains different strings of 0 and 1 > > Then the diary is saying different things from the original and you r > duplicating machine is malfunctioning. > No. The guy enter with for example 000 in the diary. Then in both cities, he is reconstitute with the same 000. But then he opens the door, and obviously, the one in Washington complete the diary into 0001, and the one in Moscow complete the diary into 0000. Then they come back in Helsinki, by train or plane, and do the experience again. The content of the diary is well duplicated, but the question is about the city they see. The 2^10 persons are the same H-guy, but having differentiated on 2^10 personal histories. Tell me if you get this. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
