> On 18 Jun 2018, at 06:55, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/17/2018 2:13 PM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: >> I think Jason answered that question very well. But who knows , the >> Transactional Interpretation could turn out to be right, it certainly makes >> far more sense than Copenhagen which isn’t even wrong. Copenhagen isn’t >> weird its self contradictory, it says quantum mechanics is the theory of the >> world and everything must follow it, but when a measurement is made (which >> is so important to Copenhagen) it insists that the measuring device and the >> observer that looks at the measuring device be classical. >> >> Well, any evidence that the device and observer are *not* classical? But if >> you want to treat them quantum mechanically, apply decoherence theory. Did >> it ever occur to you that the CI is a work in progress? AG > > JKC has mis-stated CI. CI didn't say QM as embodied in the SWE was the > theory of the world. Bohr and Heisenberg both held that the classical world > was logically prior to the quantum and that QM applied to microscopic systems > and systems composed of them but there must a scale in any particular problem > above which the system is treated classically. Heisenberg thought there > should be some cut off. Bohr thought you could put the quantum-classical > transition where ever was convenient so long as it was prior to recorded > results. This was perfectly reasonable since otherwise there would be no > results on which scientists could agree.
Yes, but then you get the debate if the “last cut” is made by consciousness (Wigner, von Neumann), or is it in the device instruments and macro-world (Prigogine), plus the problem of the FTL if you want one and only one world, etc. With mechanism, things get far clearer: all you have is very elementary arithmetic, and the physical is given by the observable mode of the universal machine (which exists as a consequence of the laws of addition and multiplication). The observable are determined by the “probability 1”, which can be translated in arithmetic by []p & <>t. We lost transitivity which is nice for the immediate apprehension, and we get a quantum logic with a sharable part (quanta) and a non sharable part (qualia). It is motivated by the UDA that we can get observation only through 1) The Sigma_1 sentences p (the arithmetical description of the leaves of the universal dovetailer, or what you can access through very elementary arithmetic (cf sigma_1 completeness = Turing universal). 2) which are true (or false in some sense) in all accessible world, in arithmetic: []p, and 3) repeatable, avoiding the cul-de-sac world condition, in arithmetic <>p. Three arithmetical and quasi-arithmetic modes satisfies this requirement: []p & p (not arithmetical, non definable by the machine concerned, but “bettable”), []p & <>t, and []p & <>t & p. To be sure there is an infinity of them, conferring to them a graded structure, which is also welcome here. They all, at the G* (true) level provides a quantum logic, and the tree of them are different, and richer than most quantum logics isolated by physicist and logicians. The richness comes from the Löb’s formula, which encapsulate the self-reference implicit in all observation (the fingers, with the sign minus points on the observer). It would already be interesting to see which of the quantum logics is closer to the empirical one. If empirical-physics is closer to []p & p, then Plotinus is more right than my own intuition or taste, and the physical is more psychological than material in the phenomenology. If empirical-physics is closer to []p & <>t, then the separation between subjective and objective is less subjective, and the sigma_1 sentences looks like “primary matter”, and that is what I expect. If empirical-physics is closer to []p & <>t & p, then we get a curious mix of both, the physical would rely On an epistemic intuitionist quantum logic. The incompleteness divides those modes on the true and assertable part of the self-discovery. Theology contains many true but not assertable propositions. There is a notion of blasphemy, and it does not send the machine into hell, but it can transform its location paradise into local hell. It is all in the head of the universal numbers. Necessarily so once we assume mechanism explicitly, which is made possible by the Church-Turing Thesis. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
