> On 9 Jul 2018, at 00:25, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Jul 8, 2018 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >>> pysicists assume arithmetic to make sense of the observations. >> >> >>Yes, whatever way that numbers are manipulated it must be consistent >> with PHYSICAL observations, if physical reality was different correct >> arithmetic would be different, > >Most people can conceive different physical laws, but nobody has ever > comes with a different arithmetical reality, using arithmetic I its standard > sense. > > By using p-adic numbers mathematicians found more than a century ago there > are a infinity of ways the numbers could be arranged because there are a > infinity of ways distance between numbers could be defined and all of them > are logically consistent. If you want to use Euclidean geometry or even the > sort of non-Euclidean geometry Einstein used you've got to use standard > arithmetic, but there are other ways. For example, in the 7-adic system the > distance between 56666 and 66666 is smaller than the distance between 66665 > and 66666; and 28814 is closer to 2 than 2 is to 3.
All Turing universal system would do. p-adic numbers presupposes elementary arithmetic. > > >Computation are not physical by definition. > > Sure if you define computation as something that happens in heaven that can > never be observed, but only somebody more interested in pondering the number > of angles that can dance on the head of a pin than in computers or science or > anything humans can detect with their senses would do so. The notion of computations do not rely not on heaven either. Robinson arithmetic is Turing universal, and that can be proved in Peano Arithmetic. Not relying on physics does not mean relying on heaven. It is you who are invoking a “god” here, to invent a new and personal notion of computation to make a reasoning invalid, but of course that is not a valid way to proceed. > > >If you can find just one paper providing a physical definition of > computation, > > A physical computation is a computation and a computation is a physical > computation, in other words the term "physical computation" is redundant, > there are only computations. If a computation is physical, it has to admit a physical definition. But apparently you cannot find it. > > >You asked me this before. Primary needs “have to be assumed”. > > I know, I asked before if you understood what philosophers meant by the term > "primary matter" and from your answer it was clear you did not. I had hoped > by now you had learned but apparently not. Because you want to use the one by Leibniz. It is OK. It comes from Aristotle. But I have made it more precise; something is primary if we have to assume it (modulo some logical equivalence). > > >>The M man is NOT the W man even though both are the H man; > > >Exactly. That is why there is an first person indeterminacy (FPI) in > Helsinki. > > In Helsinki the Helsinki man is experiencing Helsinki with 100% certainty > without a trace of indeterminacy. He is uncertain about where he will find itself after the duplication. If not, give me his algorithm to make the prediction. But you can’t because that would lead immediately to a contradiction with the discourse of all copies, which are still him with the criteria of person identity we have already agree on. > > >>make a Venn diagram out of it and you'll see why demanding to know what > one and only one city the H man will see is so silly and why drawing profound > consequences from that trivial fact is so ridiculous. > > >Oh, so you say the Helsinki man will see the tow cities? > > Bruno, you're always talking about definitions but this is one of those rare > occasions where one is desperately needed, so if you want me to answer that > question you must first give me a PRECISE definition of exactly what you mean > by "the Helsinki man". I have a precise unambitious definition of "the > Helsinki man", do you? It is guy who will survive in both Moscow and Washington, yet, in only one of those cities from its personal future point of view. To anticipate a little bit. Of course the Helsinki man is for anyone undergoing such an experience. > > >>and I asked after the experiment was completed what one and only one city > did “you" > > >That is silly. You must ask both of course. > > If its silly to ask just one of the two after the duplication them its even > sillier to ask to ask the question in Helsinki when there is only one person > in existence to ask. Of course not, unless you eliminate the 1p and 3p distinction. It is plain obvious once we assume mechanism, that after the experiment is done, both guys see only one city. > > >>So what the hell did we agree on?? > > >That the W-guy and the M-guy are both implementation of the H-guy, like > you just said above. > > I also said above the W-guy is NOT the M-guy, Excellent? Indeed. That is exactly why the H-guy is first indetermined on his immediate first person future in that experiment, like in a quantum superposition with Everett. > and before I can say we agree about the H-guy I need to know exactly > precisely what you mean by "the H-guy”. The guy before the duplication. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
