> On 8 Aug 2018, at 01:39, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >> >> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information >> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation >> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees >> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to what >> I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already from >> the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds assumes an >> infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an infinity of >> relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all measurement >> outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally the observers, >> and propagate at subliminal speed. > > I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would > want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the > superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a > superposition,
That sides with Mechanism. In arithmetic there is an infinity of identical (at the relevant representation level) brains. Now Albert and Loewer seems to associate an infinity of mind with one body. I do not understand this, and with the Mechanist “many-dreams” it is the contrary: each mind as an infinity of (virtual) bodies, and the consciousness will differentiate along their computational different continuations. Take the WM-duplication. After the reconstitution, but before the copies open the door, one mind is associated to two bodies, and then differentiates in W or in M from each location perspective. To say that the mind is not in a superposition is equivalent with Everett’s justification that the observer cannot feel the split, and it is where Everett use (more or less explicitly) the mechanist hypothesis. > so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the mix. In > the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following comment > might be relevant for you: > > "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction > between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it > seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> > or postulating a physical model for consciousness.” What does they mean by “Strong Church-Turing hypothesis”? The above sentence does not make sense. The many-worlds theory is a direct consequence of the SWE + the mechanist theory theory of mind. It is the collapse of the wave which would be threat to Mechanism (and of Rationalism). > > If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a > superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in > any such superposition), The mind cannot NOT participate to the infinite superposition which is not eliminable from arithmetic. That is why we have an infinity of body in arithmetic, and why when we look closely to the environment, i.e. below our mechanist substitution level, we must find the sign of the presence of the alternate computations, like QM-without-collapse confirmed. > the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not want to say > "Yes, Doctor". I think the complete opposite of this is correct. Church’s thesis go hand in hand with the non collapse (and non guiding potential) of the quantum wave. The only problem that Everett missed, is that, for all this to be consistent, extract the formalism of the Wave itself from the statistic on all computations. Then the logic of machine self-reference and its variants imposed by incompleteness gives the complete solution at the propositional level, and that works, in the sense that we get quantum logic where we should, making Mechanism not (yet) refuted by observations. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
