> On 19 Aug 2018, at 21:23, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/19/2018 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 17 Aug 2018, at 21:27, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 8/17/2018 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 16 Aug 2018, at 20:50, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 8/16/2018 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 Aug 2018, at 21:33, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8/15/2018 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> And you have not recovered the quantitative aspect of the quantum >>>>>>>>> structure, >>>>>>>> I did at the propositional level, which is enough to have the quantum >>>>>>>> logic. It is richer than the quantum logic of the physicians, so this >>>>>>>> predicts new things. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What are they? >>>>>> >>>>>> The consequence of the Löb’s formula translated in the quantum logical >>>>>> terms. Those are long and ugly formula, still beyond the reach of my >>>>>> (old) theorem prover. >>>>> >>>>> So they are not testable. >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> Some are testable and tested, and some are not *yet* derived, and thus not >>>> tested, but they are testable of course. Not sure how you arrive at your >>>> conclusion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> because you have not defined a measure on the computations of the UD. >>>>>>>> Not yet, but I am willing to hear some constructive suggestion to >>>>>>>> progress. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Then how can you claim to have recovered quantum mechanics if you >>>>>>> cannot even define a probability amplitude that is linear? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Because I have recovered enough to classify those logics as quantum >>>>>> logic. >>>>> >>>>> That's a far cry from quantum mechanics. >>>> >>>> But the UDA shows that if we don’t get quantum mechanics, it has to be >>>> false, or mechanism is false. The whole point is that we can test this. >>>> >>>> The goal is to get a coherent picture in the computationalist frame. >>>> Physicalism is *already* refuted. >>> >>> No. It is only your version of physicalism that is refuted. The >>> assumption that what is physical cannot account for what is mental because >>> the mental is substrate independent and therefore is independent of all >>> substrate. The last doesn't follow. >> >> >> What is a substrate? > > Supporting material.
That is short. Arithmetic supports material (appearances), but here you seem to say that a substrate would support some primary matter. The physical accounts for the Material in non physicalist theories too. It is just that the “material” appears to be a mode of the observable, definable from self-reference. > >> How you test its primary existence? > > Whether it's existence is primary or not is irrelevant. But then why criticise my use of it against physicalism? > Concrete can be the substrate of a building whether it is primary or has a > substrate of atoms. Then I am not sure we have disagreed. > >> How does a substrate select a computation, given the mechanist first person >> indeterminacy ? > > Concrete doesn't necessarily select the building, it supports it. In our > particular case it seems that evolution of carbon chemistry has selected a > computation as reproductively advantageous. Same here. Bruno > > Brent > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
