On 8/20/2018 2:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Aug 2018, at 21:23, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 8/19/2018 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Aug 2018, at 21:27, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 8/17/2018 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Aug 2018, at 20:50, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 8/16/2018 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Aug 2018, at 21:33, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 8/15/2018 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And you have not recovered the quantitative aspect of the quantum structure,
I did at the propositional level, which is enough to have the quantum logic. It
is richer than the quantum logic of the physicians, so this predicts new things.
What are they?
The consequence of the Löb’s formula translated in the quantum
logical terms. Those are long and ugly formula, still beyond the
reach of my (old) theorem prover.
So they are not testable.
?
Some are testable and tested, and some are not *yet* derived, and
thus not tested, but they are testable of course. Not sure how you
arrive at your conclusion.
because you have not defined a measure on the computations of the UD.
Not yet, but I am willing to hear some constructive suggestion to progress.
Then how can you claim to have recovered quantum mechanics if
you cannot even define a probability amplitude that is linear?
Because I have recovered enough to classify those logics as
quantum logic.
That's a far cry from quantum mechanics.
But the UDA shows that if we don’t get quantum mechanics, it has
to be false, or mechanism is false. The whole point is that we can
test this.
The goal is to get a coherent picture in the computationalist
frame. Physicalism is *already* refuted.
No. It is only your version of physicalism that is refuted. The
assumption that what is physical cannot account for what is mental
because the mental is substrate independent and therefore is
independent of all substrate. The last doesn't follow.
What is a substrate?
Supporting material.
That is short. Arithmetic supports material (appearances), but here
you seem to say that a substrate would support some primary matter.
The physical accounts for the Material in non physicalist theories
too. It is just that the “material” appears to be a mode of the
observable, definable from self-reference.
How you test its primary existence?
Whether it's existence is primary or not is irrelevant.
But then why criticise my use of it against physicalism?
Because your argument was that matter cannot account for the mental.
That question is independent of whether matter or thought or arithmetic
or whatever is fundamental.
Your argument seems to be that computationalism implies that thoughts
can be instantiated by many different material events (e.g. cosmic rays
striking neurons, a record) therefore a thought is characterized by
something independent of matter and it can be instantiated in the
immaterial relations of languages, e.g. arithmetic, combinatorics,...
But that is a cheat because "characterized" =/="instantiated".
Anything can be characterized in language. That fits very well with
this list which was started by people who liked the idea of everything
and anything from a philosophical perspective because it excused them
from explaining why this rather than that. But explaining why this
rather than that is exactly what is science's job.
Brent
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