> On 17 Sep 2018, at 19:21, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 5:04 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >>that says you should look for the simplest explanation and that is not > >>induction. Induction is not about explanations. Every animal with a nervous > >>system employs induction, even snails. > > > Yes, even jumping spider. That is why they are Löbian any universal machine > > believing in enough induction is potentially Löbian). > > Jumping spiders can perform induction but they can't perform deduction,
Explicitly? Indeed. But the functioning of a brain, or any Turing universal machine can be seen as part of a deductive system. > but some Turing Machines can perform BOTH induction AND deduction. So what > you and you alone call "Lobian Machines" are just a subset of Turing > Machines consisting of less powerful members. Other call it Gödelian machine or theory. I used GPodel-Löbian for long, and use Löbian as it is short, and it pints of the fact that such system have a provability logic entirely formalised, at the propositional logic, by the Löb formula ([]([]p -> p)->[]p). Doing induction is not enough. The induction must be sufficiently strong. Induction on sigma_0 formula, when added to Robison Arithmetic, does not lead to Löbianity. You need to add the axiom for the exponential function, or accept an induction at least on sigma_1 formula (like the theory PrL of Smorynski). Peano arithmetic use full induction (on all formula). > > > >>Machines are made of matter as is our brains, > > >Not the digital machine we are talking about. > > If it's not physical then it's not a machine. Then Turing machine are no more machine. Changing the vocabulary used by all will not help. > If physics is not involved then neither is time or space, so nothing about > the "machine" changes, and without change a calculation can not be made. See my answer in previous post. A program in Ada makes a lot of changes when run, be it in arithmetic or in a physical reality. Yu could add that matter need to be blessed with Holy water. I mean that when we do metaphysics seriously, you cannot invoke your personal metaphysics. > The integer 7 is timeless and will remain a prime number here there and > everywhere, and for that very reason it is unable to perform a calculation. > But a computer microchip, just like the physical tape on a Turing MACHINE, > can and does change and hence can perform calculations. Can perform physical calculations, but again that would beg the question if you assume Aristotle’s criteria of reality (what we see). > > >>Peano arithmetic can be run on a machine as can Zermelo-Fraenkel Set > Theory, but neither is a machine because neither is made of matter. > > >Assuming that matter exist, > > I don't think you know what you mean by "exist", I certainly don’t. I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given in all textbook of logic. It would be cool if you could avoid personal remark. > > > yes, matter appearance is Turing universal, so can run any other digital > > machine, but that does not imply that something else cannot run a machine, > > Maybe there is some way other than a Turing Machine to perform a calculation, That is ambiguous. I could mean “maybe Church’s thesis is wrong”, as it could only mean that some computations are better described at some high level, like it would be a nonsense to try t grasp how Deep Blue has win a Chess game from its “trace” at the boolean level of the (physical) machine running it. > but whatever that way is you can be certain it involves change, and that > means its physical. No. We need only the local change in the memory of the machine. I can explain all details, but you can also see how the theory of Turing machine can be explicitly arithmetise in the chapter 4 of Davis book. It is done already, quasi-explicitly (Gödel missed only the Church’s thesis) in Gödel’s 1931 paper. > Mathematicians like to brag that their subject is timeless and universal, but > when you're talking about computation that is not a advantage it is a > crippling handicap. You just show that you have never study any book on computability. Usually computational changes is defined by finite sequence, and they are defined by the usual use of exponentiation of prime factors in (unique) dnumber decomposition. The only problem is that in RA we don’t have the exponential, nor induction, which forced Gödel to use the Chinese Lemma. But that works well. > > > > No need to invoke the God of Physicalism or Primary Matter, > > And that's a good thing because nobody but you knows what the hell "the God > of Physicalism or Primary Matter” means It means a notion of matter that we assume to be obtained only by assumption. It is called sometimes “the second God of Aristotle”. It is called, in the materialist era, simply “universe” or “physical universe”. > and I'm not at all sure you do either. > > >>John neither agrees nor disagrees because it was never made clear what the > >>personal pronoun "you" means in a world with "you" duplicating machines, > > >You did. > > Ahhhh.... yet more goddamn personal pronouns! Well OK maybe so, maybe Mr.You > knows what Bruno means by "You" in a world that contains "you" duplicating > machines, but John certainly does not. We can see that, but that contradict the fact that you agree the H-guy survived the duplication. > > >>all Bruno will say is it's unique and the duplicating machine can't > >>duplicate it for some reason never specified. > > >I have explained the distinction between 1p you and 3p you. Which one are > >you talking about? > > Why ask John to explain Bruno's silly homemade peepee slang? Because you claim something is not precise, when actually you are the one dropping the precision. 14 years old kid got this. 1p and 3p is standard in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, IA; and natural language. It is plain obvious that from a first person perspective you don’t feel the split, and it is like getting a di-doppelganger. (The first person notion is defined with the diaries entering into the annihilation box, but that you call pee-pee , which is hardly an argument). > John has not the foggiest idea which "the 1p" Bruno is talking about. I tap about all 1ps concerned. From the 3p perspective they are duplicated, but from the 1p perspective, the situation is not symmetric/ One feel to be in W and the other feel to be in Moscow. That is what computationalism predicts, and the copies can only confirmed it, unless computationalism is false, of course. > > >The 3p-you is duplicable, the 1p-you is duplicable in the 3p perspective, > >but the 1p-you is NOT duplicable from its 1p-perspective. > > So right at the start of your "proof" you assume the very thing you're > attempting to prove, namely there is something unique about consciousness, How could that not follow from computationalism. How could I say “yes” to the digital surgeon if that was not the case. Then read any account on consciousness, be it Chalmers, Balckmore, Flanagan, McGuin, the unity of consciousness is tackle with binding, and integration notions, and … well to be sure I have no clue how you can doubt that first person unicity. To lack it is close to multiple personality disorder, but even in that case, each personality denies the others and feel unique. > and that a matter duplicating machine can NOT (your capitalization) duplicate > whatever that something is. I am certainly not a world class mathematician > but even I could prove the Riemann conjecture if at the start of my "proof" I > am allowed to use the axiom that the Riemann conjecture is true. > > >It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split. > > If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it can't, > then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully duplicated that what > the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. So although there are 2 brains > there is only 1 mind. It is only when the matter in the 2 brains starts to be > arranged differently, Yes. Like when oping the door of the reconstitution machine. > such as would happen the instant the doors were opened and they saw different > things, that 2 minds emerge where only 1 was before. Yes, and each mind feel unique, and so the question in Helsinki was about predicting the chance to be which one. > > > >>Just like a human a computer can prove that it s consistent if and only if > >>it is inconsistent. So if humans are "Löbian machines" then so is my iMac. > > > No. You need a Löbian theory/machine. You need to give induction axioms to > > the IMAC. > > Induction is easy deduction is hard. Many millions of species can perform > induction but only a dozen or so can do even primitive deduction and none are > as good at it as humans are or even come close. > > > You confuse computing and proving. Those are not equivalent notion. > > If a computer (aka a Turing Machine) starts with certain axioms and legal > ways those axioms can be manipulated (aka computed) and it ends up with a > theorem then that theorem has been proven. That doesn't necessarily mean the > theorem is true because the axioms could be wrong, but if you're confident > the axioms are reasonable and the legal rules to manipulate them are logical > then you should be equally confident the theorem is true. That's why it's > wise to be super conservative and careful when picking axioms. Computing can be shown equivalent with sigma_1-provability. But provability is a more general concept, for which there is no equivalent to Church’s thesis. But the verification of a proof can also be seen as a computation, but with a different semantics. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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