On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>>
> wrote:
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>
>
> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
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>>
>>
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>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
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>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
>>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except
>>> for some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>>>
>>
>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to
>> do it.
>>
>>
>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion.
>>
>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt
>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or
>> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant.
>>
>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical
>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than
>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>
>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or
>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a
>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your
>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake
>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg
>> the question).
>>
>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument
> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based
> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>
> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>
>
> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>
>
> via https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>
> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>
>
>
> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>
> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and
> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness, but a materialism
> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality
> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>
>
>
>
> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which
> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many
> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are
> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic
> “seen from inside”.
>
> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through
> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict
> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of
> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance
> from that theory of consciousness.
>
> Bruno
>
>
That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's
[ https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to summarize
in my own words the Goff view.
I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic Computationalism*
:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ
By Pure Computationalism
[ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean
that everything can be seen as computation with quantitative information
(numbers, basically) alone.
Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with
(pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff,
Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation.
But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
- pt
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