On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >> Mind is what a brain does >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. * >>>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except >>>> for some pair of legs to be doing it.* >>>> >>> >>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) >>> to do it. >>> >>> >>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. >>> >>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt >>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or >>> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. >>> >>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical >>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than >>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic. >>> >>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or >>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a >>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your >>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake >>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg >>> the question). >>> >>> Up to now, you have failed to that. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument >> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based >> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.) >> >> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this: >> >> >> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/ >> >> >> via https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 >> >> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.) >> >> >> >> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff: >> >> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and >> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness, but a materialism >> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality >> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.” >> >> >> >> >> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which >> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many >> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are >> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic >> “seen from inside”. >> >> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through >> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict >> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of >> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance >> from that theory of consciousness. >> >> Bruno >> >> > That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ > https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to summarize > in my own words the Goff view. > > I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic > Computationalism*: > > > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ > > > By Pure Computationalism [ > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean > that everything > > > Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption? > > > > > can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, > basically) alone. > > Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with > (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, > Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. > > But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states). > > > > At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can > add nuances later. > > But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief in > some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are consistent > with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here: > > B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th > International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, > SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > (sane04) > > > More details are given here: > > Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. > Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 > > Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in > Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. > > > > Bruno > > As far as I can tell from the summaries:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961071300028X https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610715000887 Realistic Computationalism (*RealComp*) is still greater than Pure Computationalism (PureComp, or just Comp, which includes all in the above two references) and it is basically Philip Goff's view: PureComp emulates how things behave, but not how they are in themselves. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
