On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 12:01:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Mind is what a brain does >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. * >>>>>>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal >>>>>>> except for some pair of legs to be doing it.* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or >>>>>> electronic) to do it. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody >>>>>> doubt that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human >>>>>> brain >>>>>> or some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. >>>>>> >>>>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the >>>>>> arithmetical reality emulates all computations. No need of any more >>>>>> assumption than Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic. >>>>>> >>>>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation >>>>>> or hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a >>>>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your >>>>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a >>>>>> mistake >>>>>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would >>>>>> beg >>>>>> the question). >>>>>> >>>>>> Up to now, you have failed to that. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument >>>>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based >>>>> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.) >>>>> >>>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> via https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 >>>>> >>>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff: >>>>> >>>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and >>>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness, but a materialism >>>>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality >>>>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may >>>>> be.” >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which >>>>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. >>>>> Many >>>>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are >>>>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic >>>>> “seen from inside”. >>>>> >>>>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through >>>>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically >>>>> predict >>>>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of >>>>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical >>>>> appearance >>>>> from that theory of consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ >>>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to >>>> summarize in my own words the Goff view. >>>> >>>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic >>>> Computationalism*: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> By Pure Computationalism [ >>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I >>>> mean that everything >>>> >>>> >>>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, >>>> basically) alone. >>>> >>>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with >>>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, >>>> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. >>>> >>>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can >>>> add nuances later. >>>> >>>> But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief >>>> in some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are >>>> consistent with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here: >>>> >>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th >>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, >>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>> (sane04) >>>> >>>> >>>> More details are given here: >>>> >>>> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. >>>> Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 >>>> >>>> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >>>> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>> As far as I can tell from the summaries: >>> >>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961071300028X >>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610715000887 >>> >>> Realistic Computationalism (*RealComp*) is still greater than Pure >>> Computationalism (PureComp, or just Comp, which includes all in the above >>> two references) >>> >>> and it is basically Philip Goff's view: >>> >>> PureComp emulates how things behave, but not how they are in themselves. >>> >>> >>> Good. In arithmetic computable entails arithmetic, but most attribute of >>> the computable thing are not computable, that is why the machine will be >>> identify with her beliefs, and this makes each machine very different, that >>> is how consciousness differentiate in arithmetic to begin with. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> In your *Progress in Biophysics & Molecular Biology* papers (which I'd >> like to see), >> >> >> Just ask. I will send you some papers I have published there. >> >> >> >> it would be interesting to see how this relates to *reflection* (the >> subject beginning with Brian Cantwell Smith's fundamental thesis) in >> programming language theory. (This is the study of code that is >> "self-aware", can reason about and modify itself, etc.) >> >> >> Are you talking about FOL and its lisp-like tower?. That is an >> interesting (albeit a bit naive metaphysically) approach. If you like >> Smith, you should like the general (and much older) theory, which is >> actually the theory of any universal machine when studying itself. But >> Smith belongs to the mechanist family, no doubt. >> >> >> >> >> In the case of consciousness, if it is something beyond pure >> informational processing - which a lot of physicists think physics just is >> (Tegmark, Carroll, ...) - it could be that chemistry and/or biology is not >> reducible to physics = not reducible to pure informational processing. >> >> This is called *nonreductive materialism*. >> >> >> You might read the sane paper (already available on my URL, see above). >> Mechanism protects the machine from (basically) all reductionism, >> including the 19th century conception of machine and numbers, and it shows >> rather directly that (reductive and non reductive) materialism are both >> inconsistent with mechanism. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > If you have PDFs of > > > Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. > Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 > > Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in > Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. > > I will read those [ email: cloudversed at gmail dot com ]. > > > > Done. > > > > > > I have read > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > Two points: > > 1. Nonreductive materialism holds that physicalism is false. > see, for example, https://people.umass.edu/lrb/files/bak06agaM.pdf > > > Indeed. But Comùputationalism, aka Digital Mechanism, makes all form of > metaphysical materialism either inconsistent or spurious (like involving > involving epicycles or worst “invisible horses”, violating Occam in a some > strong sense). > > > > > (Physicalism came from the idea that everything can be reduced to > physics, which turns out to be models of purely quantitative information. > See Tegmark's Mathematical Universe.) > > > That can be a subject of discussion later. Tegmark’s form of > mathematicalism is still physicalism, although not materialism. But he has > progressed toward computationalism, certainly. > > > > 2. A computation (what I call real computation) that incorporates > experiential states (e-states) in addition to informational states > (i-states) would be be different from any i-state-only computation > > > Very good! That is recovered in the discourse of the machine which > introspect itself (in the the Gödel-Kleene mathematical precise). To > confuse a i-state-only and a e-state, is akin to a confusion between first > person and third person, or a confusion between []p and []p & p. That is > also part of the debate between in between the neoplatonist theologians. A > good book illustrating this “Ancient Epistemology,” by Gerson (an expert on > Plotinus). You might study my PDF on how I “translate” Plotinus in > Arithmetic through the nuance brought by incompleteness on “provability”. > Incompleteness makes it from the machine perspective into believability, > and by disguishing truth and provability, it gives sense to the standard > theory of knowledge of Theaetetus, and it enforces different logics and > mathematics for believability, knowability, observability, sensibility. > Incompleteness also divides those logics into a machine justifiable (and > representational part) and a non justifiable part (still representational) > added with non representational, non represensatble part. > > The observable is the invariant in the ‘bettable', on all (halting) > computation (multiplied somehow by the non halting one), that is, with [] > for Gödel’s beweisbar arithmetical modality (the “Löbian Machine”), what > you can “meta-represent” through []p & <>t, and []p & <>t & p. I can > motivate for those definition both through through experience, and by using > the standard definition of the neoplatonist philosopher/théologian. > > > > > > (that means any Turing or hyper-Turing or reflective-Turing machine, or > anything made of just "numbers”). > > > Maybe you could define what you mean by hyper-Turing machine. I have heard > different definitions. > > Nor am I sure what you mean by made of just numbers. What I assume is that > there is a level of description of my “physical body” such that I would > survive if my “physical body” is emulated at that level, and this > relatively to the normal physical continuations. > > Many people miss that universal machine (sigma_1 complete theories are > such) are confronted to the non computable, and the first person > indeterminacy entails that below our substitution level, we are emulated by > infinitely many universal number/machine. > > > > > The latter may emulate consciousness, but will not *be* conscious. > > > Equivalently the consciousness weigh will be of measure null, may be, or > you introduce weird zombies. > > Or you talk about the oracle, the gods are not conscious, I can make some > sense of this, but I would judge all possible notion of oracle. The usual > sigma_1 machine cannot distinguish an oracle with a machine more complex > than itself. Yet by reasoning we can understand that the sigma_1 machine > are confronted with some oracle, and “time” is a sort of halting oracle > (yet not self-halting oracle) in the limit. > > People must be careful that the digital surgeon provides them with an > authentic Turing machine, or combinator, or any universal number, and not > with an hyper-Turing machine. > > > > > (Whether a conscious brain can be be manufactured with totally different > elements depends on the e-states different matter can have.) > > > > I prefer to not assume matter. My point is that IF we can survive a > digital brain transplant at some level, then physics is reduced to a > statistics on first person experience on a universal dovetailing (aka the > set of all true sigma_1 sentence structured by some modalities of > self-reference. > > The beauty here is that G* shows that all modalities are confronted to the > same (sigma_1) truth, but the machine cannot not structured in a non > equivalent way (yet related). > > > > > > > We can only make things out of matter, and we can only make new matter > with the matter we have. > > > > I guess you have to say no to the digitalis surgeon. All what I say is IF > Digital Mechanism is correct, then physics has to be extracted from the > modalities of self-reference, and so we can test it. Up to now, the Matter > modalities do obey quantum logics, and the hope is that they are enough > “hilbertian” to have an equivalent of (arithmetic termed) Gleason theorem. > > Matter exists phenomenologically with Mechanism, but what exist > ontologically is any term of any Turing complete theory, or Turing > universal machine. > > It looks we might work in very different theory. > > Bruno > > > Thanks!
By hyper-Turing I just mean computing related to doing hyperarithmetic (with Turing jumps, etc.) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory ]. I think a difference between universal computationalism (or pure computationalism) and real computationalism (the "real" word I take from Galen Strawson) is my real computationalism is something of a more practical (or pragmatist, or even engineering) perspective than a purely theoretical perspective: *PTLOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ) = program, language, transformer(compiler/assembler), object, substrate* [ draft at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ to be updated soon ] - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
