On Wednesday, September 26, 2018 at 11:46:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Sep 2018, at 21:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 12:01:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> Mind is what a brain does >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. * >>>>>>>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal >>>>>>>> except for some pair of legs to be doing it.* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or >>>>>>> electronic) to do it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody >>>>>>> doubt that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human >>>>>>> brain >>>>>>> or some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the >>>>>>> arithmetical reality emulates all computations. No need of any more >>>>>>> assumption than Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation >>>>>>> or hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a >>>>>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your >>>>>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a >>>>>>> mistake >>>>>>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would >>>>>>> beg >>>>>>> the question). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Up to now, you have failed to that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument >>>>>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning >>>>>> based >>>>>> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.) >>>>>> >>>>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> via https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 >>>>>> >>>>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff: >>>>>> >>>>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and >>>>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness, but a materialism >>>>>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality >>>>>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may >>>>>> be.” >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers >>>>>> which shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and >>>>>> Mechanism. Many believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, >>>>>> but they are logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced >>>>>> to >>>>>> arithmetic “seen from inside”. >>>>>> >>>>>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, >>>>>> through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which >>>>>> basically >>>>>> predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort >>>>>> of >>>>>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical >>>>>> appearance >>>>>> from that theory of consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ >>>>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to >>>>> summarize in my own words the Goff view. >>>>> >>>>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic >>>>> Computationalism*: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By Pure Computationalism [ >>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I >>>>> mean that everything >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, >>>>> basically) alone. >>>>> >>>>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with >>>>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, >>>>> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. >>>>> >>>>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we >>>>> can add nuances later. >>>>> >>>>> But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief >>>>> in some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are >>>>> consistent with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here: >>>>> >>>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th >>>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, >>>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>> >>>>> (sane04) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> More details are given here: >>>>> >>>>> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body >>>>> problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 >>>>> >>>>> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >>>>> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>> As far as I can tell from the summaries: >>>> >>>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961071300028X >>>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610715000887 >>>> >>>> Realistic Computationalism (*RealComp*) is still greater than Pure >>>> Computationalism (PureComp, or just Comp, which includes all in the above >>>> two references) >>>> >>>> and it is basically Philip Goff's view: >>>> >>>> PureComp emulates how things behave, but not how they are in themselves. >>>> >>>> >>>> Good. In arithmetic computable entails arithmetic, but most attribute >>>> of the computable thing are not computable, that is why the machine will >>>> be >>>> identify with her beliefs, and this makes each machine very different, >>>> that >>>> is how consciousness differentiate in arithmetic to begin with. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> In your *Progress in Biophysics & Molecular Biology* papers (which I'd >>> like to see), >>> >>> >>> Just ask. I will send you some papers I have published there. >>> >>> >>> >>> it would be interesting to see how this relates to *reflection* (the >>> subject beginning with Brian Cantwell Smith's fundamental thesis) in >>> programming language theory. (This is the study of code that is >>> "self-aware", can reason about and modify itself, etc.) >>> >>> >>> Are you talking about FOL and its lisp-like tower?. That is an >>> interesting (albeit a bit naive metaphysically) approach. If you like >>> Smith, you should like the general (and much older) theory, which is >>> actually the theory of any universal machine when studying itself. But >>> Smith belongs to the mechanist family, no doubt. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> In the case of consciousness, if it is something beyond pure >>> informational processing - which a lot of physicists think physics just is >>> (Tegmark, Carroll, ...) - it could be that chemistry and/or biology is not >>> reducible to physics = not reducible to pure informational processing. >>> >>> This is called *nonreductive materialism*. >>> >>> >>> You might read the sane paper (already available on my URL, see above). >>> Mechanism protects the machine from (basically) all reductionism, >>> including the 19th century conception of machine and numbers, and it shows >>> rather directly that (reductive and non reductive) materialism are both >>> inconsistent with mechanism. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> If you have PDFs of >> >> >> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. >> Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 >> >> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >> >> I will read those [ email: cloudversed at gmail dot com ]. >> >> >> >> Done. >> >> >> >> >> >> I have read >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> >> Two points: >> >> 1. Nonreductive materialism holds that physicalism is false. >> see, for example, https://people.umass.edu/lrb/files/bak06agaM.pdf >> >> >> Indeed. But Comùputationalism, aka Digital Mechanism, makes all form of >> metaphysical materialism either inconsistent or spurious (like involving >> involving epicycles or worst “invisible horses”, violating Occam in a some >> strong sense). >> >> >> >> >> (Physicalism came from the idea that everything can be reduced to >> physics, which turns out to be models of purely quantitative information. >> See Tegmark's Mathematical Universe.) >> >> >> That can be a subject of discussion later. Tegmark’s form of >> mathematicalism is still physicalism, although not materialism. But he has >> progressed toward computationalism, certainly. >> >> >> >> 2. A computation (what I call real computation) that incorporates >> experiential states (e-states) in addition to informational states >> (i-states) would be be different from any i-state-only computation >> >> >> Very good! That is recovered in the discourse of the machine which >> introspect itself (in the the Gödel-Kleene mathematical precise). To >> confuse a i-state-only and a e-state, is akin to a confusion between first >> person and third person, or a confusion between []p and []p & p. That is >> also part of the debate between in between the neoplatonist theologians. A >> good book illustrating this “Ancient Epistemology,” by Gerson (an expert on >> Plotinus). You might study my PDF on how I “translate” Plotinus in >> Arithmetic through the nuance brought by incompleteness on “provability”. >> Incompleteness makes it from the machine perspective into believability, >> and by disguishing truth and provability, it gives sense to the standard >> theory of knowledge of Theaetetus, and it enforces different logics and >> mathematics for believability, knowability, observability, sensibility. >> Incompleteness also divides those logics into a machine justifiable (and >> representational part) and a non justifiable part (still representational) >> added with non representational, non represensatble part. >> >> The observable is the invariant in the ‘bettable', on all (halting) >> computation (multiplied somehow by the non halting one), that is, with [] >> for Gödel’s beweisbar arithmetical modality (the “Löbian Machine”), what >> you can “meta-represent” through []p & <>t, and []p & <>t & p. I can >> motivate for those definition both through through experience, and by using >> the standard definition of the neoplatonist philosopher/théologian. >> >> >> >> >> >> (that means any Turing or hyper-Turing or reflective-Turing machine, or >> anything made of just "numbers”). >> >> >> Maybe you could define what you mean by hyper-Turing machine. I have >> heard different definitions. >> >> Nor am I sure what you mean by made of just numbers. What I assume is >> that there is a level of description of my “physical body” such that I >> would survive if my “physical body” is emulated at that level, and this >> relatively to the normal physical continuations. >> >> Many people miss that universal machine (sigma_1 complete theories are >> such) are confronted to the non computable, and the first person >> indeterminacy entails that below our substitution level, we are emulated by >> infinitely many universal number/machine. >> >> >> >> >> The latter may emulate consciousness, but will not *be* conscious. >> >> >> Equivalently the consciousness weigh will be of measure null, may be, or >> you introduce weird zombies. >> >> Or you talk about the oracle, the gods are not conscious, I can make some >> sense of this, but I would judge all possible notion of oracle. The usual >> sigma_1 machine cannot distinguish an oracle with a machine more complex >> than itself. Yet by reasoning we can understand that the sigma_1 machine >> are confronted with some oracle, and “time” is a sort of halting oracle >> (yet not self-halting oracle) in the limit. >> >> People must be careful that the digital surgeon provides them with an >> authentic Turing machine, or combinator, or any universal number, and not >> with an hyper-Turing machine. >> >> >> >> >> (Whether a conscious brain can be be manufactured with totally different >> elements depends on the e-states different matter can have.) >> >> >> >> I prefer to not assume matter. My point is that IF we can survive a >> digital brain transplant at some level, then physics is reduced to a >> statistics on first person experience on a universal dovetailing (aka the >> set of all true sigma_1 sentence structured by some modalities of >> self-reference. >> >> The beauty here is that G* shows that all modalities are confronted to >> the same (sigma_1) truth, but the machine cannot not structured in a non >> equivalent way (yet related). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We can only make things out of matter, and we can only make new matter >> with the matter we have. >> >> >> >> I guess you have to say no to the digitalis surgeon. All what I say is IF >> Digital Mechanism is correct, then physics has to be extracted from the >> modalities of self-reference, and so we can test it. Up to now, the Matter >> modalities do obey quantum logics, and the hope is that they are enough >> “hilbertian” to have an equivalent of (arithmetic termed) Gleason theorem. >> >> Matter exists phenomenologically with Mechanism, but what exist >> ontologically is any term of any Turing complete theory, or Turing >> universal machine. >> >> It looks we might work in very different theory. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > Thanks! > > By hyper-Turing I just mean computing related to doing hyperarithmetic > (with Turing jumps, etc.) > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory ]. > > > > OK. Nice precision. Yes arithmetic is full of Gods (non Turing emulable > things, person persons). I would invoke them at the least resort, and most > still obeys to the same theology, that they are Löbian, and obeys to G and > G*, leading to similar physics than us, but at different level. That was > seen by Solovay already in his 1976 paper. Boolos explains some of them in > his 1993 book. > > > > I think a difference between universal computationalism (or pure > computationalism) and real computationalism (the "real" word I take from > Galen Strawson) is my real computationalism is something of a more > practical (or pragmatist, or even engineering) perspective than a purely > theoretical perspective: > > > OK. My interest is pragmatical too, but probably more after death than > before, somehow. It is pragmatical too in the sense that learning to the > machine’s already existing, despite it still require studying mathematical > logic, provide a sort of etalon theology helming to compare the human > theology, especially that there is a theological trap, leading for example > to irrationalism in the field like when separated from science. > > My intellectual interest is in the mind-body problem, and who am I, what > can be expected, etc. > > I am humble enough to know that we cannot know the truth “for sure”, but > with mechanism, we get a pretty good collection of mathematical tools to > put some light (and see that things are more complicated than expected). > > > > > > > *PTLOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ) = program, language, transformer(compiler/assembler), > object, substrate* > > > [ draft at > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ > to be updated soon ] > > > OK. > > Bruno > > > >
I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of programming language theory (*PLT*). Any entry point is OK. https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back into mathematica logic. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
